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SUMMARY
This thesis comprises essays on Political Economy and Industrial Organization. The
rst two chapters are composed of research papers on Political Economy, which contribute
to the literature on split-ticket voting and lobbying formation, respectively. The other
two chapters on Industrial Organization are based on joint research papers with Luis C.
Corchón, where we study the welfare losses yielded by imperfect competition under product
di¤erentiation. Each chapter can be considered independently of the rest.
Chapter I proposes a novel rationale for split-ticket voting, when citizens vote for candidates
from di¤erent parties in simultaneous elections. It applies a political agency framework with
implicit incentives to study ticket splitting in simultaneous municipal and regional elections.
The results suggest that ticket splitting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme
adopted by voters to motivate politicianse¤orts in a retrospective voting environment. An
o¢ ce-motivated politician (mayor or governor) is assumed to prefer her counterpart to be
a¢ liated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voters to
adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging
to the same party or di¤erent parties. The model is dynamic, generating predictions of
split-ticket voting over time. Ticket splitting is shown to be less likely than electing candi-
dates from the same party, but somewhat a¤ected by ticket splitting in the previous period.
Ticket splitting is also more likely in smaller municipalities, where the party a¢ liation of a
mayor is assumed to be of less importance to the governor. These ndings are consistent
with empirical evidence from simultaneous municipal and regional elections held in Spain.
Chapter II analyzes the impact of lobbying, modeled as a common-agency problem, on a
public goods provision. It introduces a sincere lobbying formation condition for equilibrium,
namely, an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer her lobby to cease to
exist. The results suggest that individuals with more extreme income levels are more likely
to join lobbying activities. The model is solved numerically for the US data to show that
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lobbying does not necessarily favor the rich. If the government does not care about its
reelection chances and does care about individualswelfare, nal policy outcome favors the
poor. The lobby of the poor is more numerous and in total contributes more than the lobby
of the rich. However, per member contribution is greater in the lobby of the rich. In the
case where the elections are coming and the government wants to be reelected, lobbying
does favor the rich. Although the lobby of the poor is more numerous, it contributes in
total and per member less than the lobby of the rich. If the government cares only about
contribution payments all individuals participate in lobbying, and political competition re-
sults in a socially optimal outcome.
Chapter III studies the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) yielded by imperfect competition
under product di¤erentiation. When demand is linear, even if prices, outputs, costs and the
number of rms can be observed, PWL is arbitrary in both Cournot and Bertrand equilib-
ria. If in addition the elasticity of demand (resp. cross elasticity of demand) is known, PWL
in a Cournot (resp. Bertrand) equilibrium is calculated. When demand is isoelastic and
there are many rms, PWL can be computed from prices, outputs, costs and the number
of rms. The results suggest that price-marginal cost margins and demand elasticities may
inuence PWL in a counterintuitive way. The chapter also provides conditions under which
PWL increases or decreases with concentration.
Chapter IV studies PWL in models of horizontal and vertical di¤erentiation. In the
Hotelling model, PWL is shown to depend on the underlying parameters in a non-monotonic
way. It is also shown that PWL can be calculated from market datalocations and mar-
ket sizeexcept when the market is covered and exhibits maximal product di¤erentiation.
PWL can be very largeup to 37.4%arising from rms located in the wrong places. In the
Salop model, PWL can be calculated from market size. PWL may be largeup to 25%but,
in general, smaller than in the Hotelling model because rms are optimally located here.
Finally, under vertical di¤erentiation with two rms, PWL is discontinuous, but can be
calculated from market prices and market coverage. In this model PWL is modest, always
below 8.33%.
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Esta tesis comprende cuatro ensayos de economía política y organización industrial. Los
dos primeros capítulos se reeren a temas de economía política: Al problema del voto di-
vidido y al de la formación de grupos de presión. Los otros dos capítulos tratan de temas
de organización industrial y están basados en trabajos conjuntos con Luis C. Corchón. En
ellos se estudian las pérdidas de bienestar generadas por la competencia imperfecta cuando
el producto está diferenciado. Cada capítulo puede leerse independientemente del resto.
El Capítulo I propone una nueva explicación del voto dividido, cuando los ciudadanos votan
en elecciones simultáneas por candidatos que podrían pertenecer a partidos políticos difer-
entes. Se usa un modelo de principal-agente con incentivos implícitos al voto dividido en
elecciones municipales y regionales. Los resultados sugieren que el voto dividido es el resul-
tado de un esquema de reelección óptimo que es adoptado por los votantes para motivar el
esfuerzo de los políticos. Un político que pretende alcanzar la victoria electoral preferiría
estar rodeado de políticos de su mismo partido. Esta correlación de incentivos lleva a los
votantes a adoptar una regla de evaluación conjunta que está inuída por el hecho de que
los políticos pertenecen al mismo o a diferente partido. El modelo es dinámico, generando
predicciones de voto dividido en el tiempo. Se prueba que este fenómeno es menos prob-
able que elegir candidatos del mismo partido y está afectado por la división de votos en
el período previo. La división del voto es más probable que ocurra en municipalidades
pequeñas donde la aliación política de un alcalde es de menos importancia al gobernador
de la provincia. La evidencia empírica de elecciones municipales y regionales en España
conrma esas predicciones teóricas.
El Capítulo II analiza el impacto de los grupos de presión en la provisión de bienes públi-
cos cuando el problema se modeliza como uno de agencia común. Se dene la noción de
"Formación sincera de grupos de presión" en la que ningún miembro del grupo preere que
su grupo no exista. Los resultados sugieren que los individuos con niveles de renta más
extremos son los que tienen más incentivos para ser miembros de los grupos de presión.
El modelo se resuelve numéricamente usando datos de Estados Unidos y muestra que los
grupos de presión no necesariamente favorecen a los ricos. Si al gobierno en el poder no le
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importa su reelección y le importa el bienestar de los ciudadanos, el resultado de la acción
de los grupos de presión favorece a los pobres. El grupo de presión de estos últimos es más
numeroso y contribuye con más recursos que el grupo de presión de los ricos. Sin embargo
el grupo de presión de estos últimos tiene una mayor contribución por individuo. Si el
gobierno desea ser reelegido, la actividad de los grupos de presión favorece a los ricos ya
que estos contribuyen más en términos absolutos. Si al gobierno solo le importa el dinero
que recibe de los grupos de presión el resultado es el óptimo socialmente.
El Capítulo III estudia el porcentaje de pérdida de bienestar que está generado por la com-
petencia imperfecta cuando hay diferenciación del producto. Cuando la demanda es lineal el
conocimiento de los precios la producción, los costes y el número de empresas no basta para
obtener las pérdidas de bienestar y éstas son arbitrarias bajo competencia en cantidades o
en precios. Pero si la elasticidad de la demanda (propia o cruzada) se conoce, entonces las
pérdidas de bienestar se pueden deducir de los datos de mercado cuando la competencia
es en cantidades o en precios. Cuando la demanda es isoelástica, las pérdidas de bienestar
se pueden computar de los precios, la producción, los costes y el número de empresas. En
algunos casos, los márgenes precio-coste marginal y las elasticidades de demanda pueden
afectar a las pérdidas de bienestar de manera muy poco intuitiva. También se estudian las
condiciones bajo las que las pérdidas de bienestar aumentan o disminuyen con la concen-
tración.
El Capítulo IV estudia las pérdidas de bienestar en modelos de diferenciación horizontal
y vertical. En el caso del modelo de Hotelling, las pérdidas de bienestar dependen de
los parámetros que denen la economía de una manera que no es monótona. También se
prueba que las pérdidas de bienestar se pueden calcular de los datos de mercado como
la localización y el tamaño del mercado, excepto cuando todo el mercado está cubierto y
hay diferenciación máxima. Las pérdidas de bienestar pueden ser muy grandes, de hasta el
37.4% y son debidas principalmente a la localización incorrecta de las empresas. En el mod-
elo de Salop, las pérdidas de bienestar se pueden calcular del tamaño de mercado. Aquellas
pueden ser grandes, de hasta un 25%, pero son, en general, más pequeñas que en el modelo
xii
de Hotelling, ya que en este caso las empresas están situadas óptimamente. Finalmente
bajo diferenciación vertical con dos empresas, las pérdidas de bienestar son discontinuas
pero pueden ser calculadas de los precios y la cobertura del mercado. En este modelo, las
pérdidas de bienestar son modestas, siempre más pequeñas que el 8.33%.
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CHAPTER I
SPLIT-TICKET VOTING: AN IMPLICIT INCENTIVE
APPROACH
1.1 Introduction
Split-ticket voting, when a citizen votes for candidates from di¤erent parties in simultaneous
elections, is a common feature of modern political systems. Ticket splitting has mostly been
studied in the context of the US, where simultaneous presidential and congressional elections
are held every four years (see Burden and Kimball 2002, Fiorina 1996, Jacobson 1990, and
Zupan 1991, among many others).
To the best of my knowledge, there are several formal models of split-ticket voting.
They are mainly based on an institutional assumption that a nal policy choice depends on
both the executive and the composition of the legislature. Indeed, Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, 1996) elaborated on the policy balancing argument, showing that citizens strate-
gically split tickets to avoid the extreme policies that may arise when the executive and
legislative branches are allied. Chari et al. (1997) built a model on the budgetary exter-
nality of concentrated government spending nanced by uniform taxes. They found that
voters prefer a scally conservative president (to restrain overall spending) and scally lib-
eral congressmen (who promote spending in their home districts). In turn, Bugarin (2003)
showed that voters split tickets in order to reinforce opposition in the legislature as a means
of the executive corruption control. Fox and Van Weelden (2009) proposed an alternative
rationale for ticket splitting based on the need for e¤ective oversight of the executive in a
career concerns framework. Note that these models explain ticket splitting in a particular
institutional setting where a nal policy outcome is determined by both branches of govern-
ment (e.g., the executive and the legislature). This paper complements the aforementioned
1
literature and analyzes ticket splitting at lower levels of governmentin particular, munic-
ipal and regional levels of governmentwhere the assumption about such an institutional
setting can be relaxed. As a rule, mayors and governors face distinct well-determined tasks
and have to implement distinct policies.
In this paper, I apply an implicit incentive approach to explain ticket splitting within
a retrospective voting model (i.e., a political agency model with moral hazard). In my
framework, split-ticket voting arises as an outcome of the optimal implicit reward scheme
voters use to induce politicianse¤orts. The model is dynamic, generating predictions of
ticket splitting over time. This feature is original; none of the aforementioned contributions
has analyzed ticket splitting in a dynamic context.
I consider a representative municipality in a region where the mayoral and gubernatorial
elections are simultaneous. I work with the two settings: one with a single large city whose
vote is decisive for the outcome of the regional election, and one with many cities of varying
size. In the latter case, each city has a probability proportional to its population of playing
a pivotal role in the regional election.
I use a political agency model of interaction between politicians and their constituency
in the presence of a moral hazard problem. The politicians want to be reelected for another
term, and are held accountable for their past performance at the moment of election. The
politicians therefore have incentives to satisfy the voterswishes. In addition, I assume that
the politicians are loyal to their respective political parties: the mayor prefers the governor
to be a¢ liated with the same political party, and vice versa.1 Hence, the incentives of the
mayor and governor are correlated. The voters care about the politiciansperformances,
which are observable but not contractible. The voters evaluate the incumbents perfor-
mance and vote accordingly. More precisely, the voters employ implicit evaluation rules
when deciding whether to reward (reelect) politicians. Obviously, voters can inuence the
politiciansbehavior through their choice of evaluation rules. I restrict the space of possible
1Fox and Van Weelden (2009) introduce a similar assumption about the partisan preferences of the
legislature. In particular, in their career concerns setup the legislature ("overseer") can care about the
executives reputation. For example, a partisan overseer may seek to damage the reputation of an executive
from the other party while seeking to protect the reputation of an executive from her own party.
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evaluation rules to linear functions of performance. The evaluation rules are also required
to be sequentially rational.
I show that given the correlation between the two politicians incentives, voters are
better o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule (conditioned on the incumbents
belonging to the same party or di¤erent parties) rather than an individual politician per-
formance evaluation rule. In particular, the voters evaluate the performance of the mayor
and governor from the same party as a team. If the mayor and governor belong to di¤erent
parties, then the voters compare their performances to create a competitive environment.
This combination of rules implies that improved performance increases a politicians own
reelection probability, while increasing/decreasing the reelection probability of her partisan
ally/rival in the other o¢ ce. Politicians therefore have extra incentives to perform better,
for the sake of their party as well as for themselves.
In equilibrium, the reelection outcomes of incumbents from the same party are there-
fore positively correlated: voters tend to reward both incumbents from a well-performing
party, or punish both incumbents from a poorly-performing party. The reelection outcomes
of incumbents from di¤erent parties are negatively correlated: voters tend to reward the
incumbent from the better-performing party while punishing the other incumbent. This
combination generates a dynamic of partisan voting: whether or not the incumbent politi-
cians belong to the same party, ticket splitting is always less likely than electing both
candidates from the same party.
Next, I consider two cases. First, there might be some preference for incumbents such
that a mayor/governor prefers a known incumbent from her own party to a new politician
a¢ liated with the same party to hold the other o¢ ce. The allied incumbents therefore have
extra incentives to perform well so that they continue working together. This implies that
politicians from the same party exert a higher total e¤ort than politicians from di¤erent
parties. Voters adopt joint performance evaluation rules, under which the reelection out-
comes of incumbents from the same party are somewhat more correlated in absolute value,
as compared with the ones from di¤erent parties. Ticket splitting is therefore more likely in
elections where the incumbents belong to di¤erent parties, which in turn is a consequence
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of ticket splitting in the previous period. Second, there might be some preference for new-
comers such that a mayor/governor prefers a new unknown member of her own party to
a known incumbent ally for the other o¢ ce. So the incumbents from the same party have
somewhat less incentives to perform well and therefore exert a lower total e¤ort than politi-
cians from di¤erent parties. The joint reelection rules for politicians from the same party
are less correlated (in absolute value) than the ones for politicians from di¤erent parties.
Ticket splitting is thus more likely in elections where the incumbents belong to the same
party, i.e., where the voters did not split tickets in the previous period.
These results rest on the assumption of politicians party loyalty ; that is, I assumed
that a mayor/governor cares about the party a¢ liation of the governor/mayor. The joint
performance evaluation rules then give extra implicit incentives to the politicians. If I
relax the assumption of party loyalty, this e¤ect vanishes and the voters no longer evaluate
incumbents jointly. Instead they use a cut-o¤ rule that each incumbent is reappointed
only when her individual performance exceeds a critical threshold. In this situation, the
probability of ticket splitting goes up.
Furthermore, I assume that the mayors party a¢ liation is of less importance in smaller
municipalities. This may happen for two reasons: the mayors are more likely to run as
independents (or be a¢ liated with a minor party) and the constituencies already know
the candidates very well. (Recall that one of the major roles of political parties is to
provide information about unknown politicians.) Thus, a governor cares less about the
party a¢ liation of small-town mayors. As a result, the two politiciansincentives are less
correlated. In this situation, the incumbents are more likely to be evaluated individually
rather than jointly, which increases the probability of ticket splitting.
To sum up the predicted dynamics of the model, I nd that ticket splitting is less likely
than voting for candidates from the same party. Moreover, ticket splitting is somewhat
a¤ected by ticket splitting in the previous period. Finally, I nd that ticket splitting is
more likely to occur in small municipalities than in large ones. In the empirical section of
this paper, I estimate the probability of ticket splitting using panel data on the aggregate
results of simultaneous municipal and regional elections in Spain. The predictions outlined
4
above are consistent with the results of this empirical analysis.
I turn now to the fundamental question of why political constitution is modeled as
political agency. Firstly, in addition to a sound theoretical framework, this approach has
received considerable empirical support (see, for example, Peltzman 1992 and Besley and
Case 1995a, 1995b, 2003). Besley (2006) provides an excellent introduction to political
agency models and "emphasizes the empirical potential of these models in explaining real
world policy choices."2 Secondly, I believe that at the municipal and regional levels politi-
cianstasks require mainly managerial skills. This view is supported by the empirical work
of Ferreira and Gyourko (2009), who found that in US cities the mayors party a¢ liation
does not a¤ect the size of the city government and the allocation of spending. In a recent
article in the New York Times, Glaeser points out that "lack of ideology has become a major
feature of big city mayors... They are... managerial mayors, appreciated by voters because
they succeed in making the city work."3 The political agency approach may therefore be
appropriate to model local political constitutions. Even so, elected politicians can only
be o¤ered implicit incentive schemes; public policies are di¢ cult to reward with explicit
contracts.
The retrospective voting model I use goes back to Barro (1973). Ferejohn (1986) ex-
tended the model and studied subgame-perfect equilibria rather than Nash equilibria. Pers-
son et al. (1997) use a retrospective voting approach to study rent extraction. In Austen-
Smith and Banks (1989) voters adopt retrospective voting strategies that are conditioned on
the di¤erence between the incumbents performance and her initial policy platform. Banks
and Sundaram (1993, 1996) analyze retrospective voting settings with both moral hazard
and adverse selection, and with term limits respectively.
The results of this paper are also related to the literature on horizontal and vertical
intergovernmental competition. Most analyses of horizontal competition are based on the
assumption of interjurisdictional mobility of consumers, à la Tiebout (1956). In a similar
2Besley (2006), p. 3.
3Edward L. Glaeser "Lower (and More Realistic) Presidential Expectations," January 20, 2009.
Available online at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/lower-and-more-realistic-presidential-
expectations/ (accessed January 26, 2009).
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vein, the literature on yardstick competition between jurisdictions started with the seminal
work of Salmon (1987), to be followed by Besley and Case (1995a), Bordignon et al. (2004),
Sand-Zantman (2004), Belleamme and Hindriks (2005), Besley and Smart (2007) and
others. The main assumption of this literature is that under decentralization, voters use a
comparative performance evaluation between di¤erent local governments to create yardstick
competition.
The vertical competition literature, on the other hand, assumes that "senior and junior
governments provide similar or comparable services, and that o¢ ce-holders in the gov-
ernment which is judged by citizens to be the more e¢ cient supplier will increase their
probability of getting the vote of these citizens"4 (see Breton 1996, Breton and Fraschini
2003, Breton and Salmon 2001, Volden 2005 and Volden 2007). I follow these authors in
assuming that voters compare the performance of local and regional governments, and are
likely to reward the more e¢ cient politicians with reelection. There is, however, an impor-
tant di¤erence between my research and the papers just cited. In the intergovernmental
competition literature, the comparative performance evaluation result is driven by either
correlated shocks or interjurisdictional spillover. In my model, the joint performance eval-
uation arises from the fact that the politicians incentives are correlated: each one cares
not only about her own reelection prospects, but also about the success of other politicians
a¢ liated with the same political party.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 lays out a model of ticket
splitting in one large city pivotal to the regional election. Section 1.3 presents a model of
ticket splitting in a region with many small cities. Section 1.4 describes empirical results
on Spanish elections. Finally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Ticket Splitting in a Large City
In this section I study ticket splitting in simultaneous municipal and regional elections held
in a large city. I assume that the city is large enough that its vote will be decisive for the
regional election.
4Breton and Salmon (2001), p. 139.
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Consider a large city, with an innite horizon, that has to elect mayor M (for the
municipal government) and governor G (for the region to which this city belongs). The city
is inhabited by a large number (formally a continuum) of individuals. The individuals live
forever. At the beginning of each period, the elections take place simultaneously and the
winners are determined by majority rule. Politicians running for both o¢ ces belong to one
of the two political parties, L or R. I assume that there is exactly one candidate from each
partythe incumbent and an opponentin each election and in each period. The opponents
are identical to the incumbents in all respects except party a¢ liation. The participation
constraints of the politicians are always satised, and there is no term limit.
First I will describe a stage game with a stationary environment, where time subscripts
can be dropped with no risk of confusion. I will then consider an innitely repeated game.
One stage is a sequential political agency game between politicians (the mayor and
governor) and their constituency (the voters). While in o¢ ce, each politician i 2 fM;Gg
has to implement a policy determined by her unobservable e¤ort ai.5 The set of e¤orts
available to each politician is taken to be a non-degenerate interval [0; a]  R. I assume
that the performance of politician i, pi, is observed with an independent and unobservable
noise "i:
pi = ai + "i;
with "i  N
 
0; 2

.6
The reward of politician i is denoted by i (ai). E¤ort is costly, and I assume the
standard convex cost function a
2
i
2 .
7 The mayor and governor independently choose e¤ort
5One can add an adverse selection problem by assuming that policy outcomes are determined by e¤ort
and ability. The results are qualitatively the same if ability is modeled as a moving average (to capture the
idea that a policymakers competence changes slowly over time).
6 I have an extended version of the model, available upon request, where the two noise terms "M and
"G are correlated and follow a bivariate normal distribution. I want to concentrate however on the case
where voters introduce joint performance evaluation due to the correlation between politicians incentives
rather than the correlation between shocks. The latter topic has been widely studied in the context of team
evaluation in contract theory (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005) and in the literature on
yardstick competition (see the references on yardstick competition in the Introduction).
7 I have an extended version of the model, available upon request, where the cost of policy implementation
for the mayor and governor from the same party is di¤erent than for the politicians from rival parties (e.g.,
because of synergy). The results of this extended model are qualitatively the same.
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levels ai to maximize their utility, which is given by
i (ai)  a
2
i
2
:
The function i (ai) will be explicitly dened in subsection 1.2.1.
There is no cost of voting, and I assume that there are no abstainers. The individuals
di¤er in their preferences over political parties. I assume that some individuals always
prefer party L to party R, and vote for candidates from party L in both elections. Likewise,
other individuals are loyal to party R. However, there is a large group of uncommitted
individuals, whose votes are decisive for the outcome of both elections. These voters care
about the politiciansperformances in each period according to a linear utility function
pM + pG:
In what follows, I refer to this group of decisive voters simply as "the voters".
I assume that the voters coordinate to apply the same retrospective reappointment rules
to reelect the incumbents. I follow the literature (e.g. Persson et al. 1997) in restricting
the strategy space such that the voters base their reappointment decision solely on the
politiciansperformances in the current period, not in any previous period. See Persson et
al. (1997) for a discussion of the plausibility of this approach, and Fair (1978) and Kramer
(1971) for empirical ndings in its favor.
Denote by S the state where mayor M and governor G are members of the same party
(either L or R), and by D the state where M and G belong to di¤erent parties. State
S and state D occur when in the previous period the voters did not split or split tickets
respectively.
The timing of events in the stage game is as follows. First, state S or D is realized.
Second, the voters decide on the reappointment rules to be used in the coming elections.
Third, the politicians exert e¤orts aM and aG. Fourth, the politiciansperformances pM
and pG are observed. Finally, both elections take place simultaneously and the voters apply
the selected reappointment rules to reward or punish the incumbents.
In the following subsection I describe the politicianspreferences. I will then turn to the
votersproblem and dene an equilibrium concept.
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1.2.1 Politicians
The politicianspreferences are as follows. First, once elected, mayor M and governor G
want to be reelected in the next period. Moreover, M wants to improve her partys chances
to win the governors o¢ ce in the coming election. If G and M belong to the same party,
thenM prefers G to be reelected. Otherwise,M wants the voters to appoint a new governor
(from her own party) for the next term. Likewise, G wants M to be reelected if they are
members of the same party, and wants the opponent to be appointed if M is from the
rival party. The value of holding o¢ ce is normalized to 1. The values, which M and G
associate to their partiesholding the other o¢ ce, are denoted by M and 

G respectively.
Furthermore, denote by Pri () the probability of being reelected to o¢ ce i 2 fM;Gg in the
coming election. Therefore, politician i has the following reward function i : [0; a]
2 ! R
that depends continuously on both politicianse¤orts:
i (ai; aj) =
8>><>>:
Pri (ai; aj) + 
S
i Prj (ai; aj) if S
Pri (ai; aj) + 
D
i (1  Prj (ai; aj)) if D;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg and j 6= i. The preferences stated above reect the politicians al-
legiance to their respective parties; individual politicians care about their partys overall
representation in mayor and governor o¢ ces, not just their own reelection prospects.8 Still,
the reasonable assumption here is that a mayor/governor values her own o¢ ce more than
her partys representation in the other o¢ ce; i.e., 0  i  1.9 I call i the degree of politi-
cian is loyalty to her party (or the strength of her party alignment). The two alternative
cases will be considered. First, there might be some preference for incumbents: Si  Di .
This case reects the idea that a mayor/governor might prefer an incumbent a¢ liated with
the same party to an unknown candidate for the other o¢ ce. Second, politicians might
prefer newcomers: Si < 
D
i . Thus, a mayor/governor would like a new politician (i.e., a
newcomer) from the same party to be elected for the other o¢ ce.
8Alternatively, the stated preferences could arise because the mayor and governor have to interact while
in o¢ ce. Each prefers working with a member of her own party rather than a rival.
9 In other words, politician i does not mind reducing her reelection chances by 1% in exchange for in-
creasing her allys election probability by 1
i
%  1%.
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The model can be generalized to the case where the incumbents maximize their intertem-
poral utility function (as in Ferejohn 1986). At this stage, however, I want to concentrate
on the interactions between politicians and voters. I therefore assume, as in Alesina and
Tabellini (2008), that the incumbents are myopic: they care about reelection only in the
next period, not in any subsequent period.
1.2.2 Voters
The politiciansperformances pM and pG (but not their composition between e¤ort and
noise) are observed at the end of each period but are not contractible. Public policies
are di¢ cult to reward with explicit contracts. It is more natural to use implicit incentive
contracting in this situation. I assume that the voters coordinate on the same retrospective
voting rule, and that there is no coordination failure among the voters. A coordination
problem is a serious issue, but lies beyond the scope of the paper.
The voters observe politiciansperformances pM and pG, and in the coming elections
they reward incumbents according to their performances in the current period; i.e., they
reappoint incumbents who have shown "good" results in the current period. A politician
thrown out of o¢ ce is never reappointed. In this case an opponent from the rival party is
elected.
Obviously the voters can inuence the politicians behavior through their choice of
evaluation rules. Intuitively, since politicians care about the reelection chances of each other,
the reward rules should allow for joint performance evaluation. Under joint performance
evaluation the voters condition reelection of politician i on her own performance pi (to
give her incentives to perform well since she wants to be reelected) and on performance of
politician j, pj (to give incentives to politician j since he cares about is reelection chances).
I restrict the functional space of performance evaluation rules to linear joint evaluation rules
(M ; bM ) and (G; bG). M and G are the slopes of the mayor and governor evaluation
rules respectively, while bM and bG are the corresponding intercepts; M ; G; bM ; bG 2 R,
MG  1. Under rules (i; bi), i 2 fM;Gg, the probability of being reelected for o¢ ce i is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big)
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Figure 1: Mayor M and governor G reelection outcomes under linear rules (M ; bM ) and
(G; bG) in the two-dimensional space of performances pM and pG.
with i; j 2 fM;Gg and j 6= i. Figure 1 depicts the possible outcomes for M and G under
rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG) in the two-dimensional space of observed performances pM and
pG. Note that I require MG  1, so that line pM + MpG = bM is steeper than line
pG + GpM = bG. Otherwise, as one can see from Figure 1, a mayor and governor with
poor performance would be reelected while politicians with better performance would not.
Note that under linear rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG), Ms reelection is determined by
random variable "M + M"G  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2M

2

, and Gs reelection is determined by
random variable "G + G"M  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2G

2

. I say that the two reelection events are
independent when M = 0 and G = 0, positively correlated when M > 0 and G > 0,
and negatively correlated when M < 0 and G < 0.
Since di¤erentiable functions are linear in rst-order approximation, the restriction to
linear rules gives an approximate t to more general evaluation rules. Furthermore, the
linear evaluation rules allow for a closed-form solution. Linear approximation methods are
widely used in macroeconomics to search for time-consistent equilibria (e.g. Krusell et al.
1997). In the contract theory literature, linear contracts have been shown to be optimal
under some realistic assumptions (for an overview, see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005).
As I mentioned above, in this framework split-ticket voting emerges naturally from the
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chosen evaluation rules. That is, following the chosen rules can result in the election of
politicians from di¤erent parties. Henceforth I will nd it more convenient to refer to S and
D as the states characterized by the politicians belonging to the same party or di¤erent
parties, keeping in mind that state S or state D occurs when the voters did not split tickets
or split tickets respectively.
1.2.3 Equilibrium Concept
In the stage game I search for a subgame perfect equilibrium by analyzing the game back-
wards. First, I solve for the politicianse¤orts aM and aG under rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG).
Second, I examine the voterschoice of evaluation rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG). In what
follows I introduce two denitions.
Given linear performance evaluation rules (M ; bM ) and (G; bG), the equilibrium in
e¤ort strategies is a prole of e¤orts (aeM ; a
e
G) such that
i
 
aei ; a
e
j
  ae2i
2
 i
 
ai; a
e
j
  a2i
2
for each ai 2 [0; a] ;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
The voters are rational, so they realize that the only alternative to reelecting incumbents
is voting for opponents from rival parties. The politicians performances are additively
separable in e¤ort and noise, and all politicians behave in the same way irrespective of the
noise. If elected, opponent i will exert equilibrium e¤ort aei , which maximizes her expected
utility. Thus, the voters compare the incumbents performances with their opponents
expected performances and vote accordingly. Formally,
bi = a
e
i + ia
e
j :
Thus, the linear joint performance evaluation rules are solely determined by slopes i and
j .
I dene an equilibrium in rule strategies as the doublet (M ; 

G) such that
aeM (

M ; 

G) + a
e
G (

M ; 

G) = max
M ;G
MG1
aeM (M ; G) + a
e
G (M ; G) ;
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where (aeM () ; aeG ()) is an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. Finally, the politiciansequilib-
rium e¤orts are denoted by ai  aei
 
i ; 

j

, i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
Now consider an innitely repeated game where each stage is the sequential political
agency game presented above. First, recall that the reappointment decision depends only on
the politiciansperformances in the current period and not in any previous period. Second,
recall that the incumbents are "myopic": they care about reelection only in the next period
and not in any subsequent period. Under these assumptions on the votersstrategy space
and the politicianspreferences, I consider the particular Markov Perfect Equilibrium of
the innitely repeated game where a stage game equilibrium in rule strategies is replicated
innitely often. The payo¤-relevant states are S and D.
I must stress here that the evaluation rules are required to be sequentially rational; no
precommitment is allowed. The model parameters are common knowledge, so the politicians
know whether the voters used the evaluation rules that had been rational for them in the
previous period or deviated. In the latter case, the politicians conclude that the voters
reappoint incumbents randomly or use unknown rules that are not based on performance.
As a result, from that period onward, the politicians will exert zero e¤ort to minimize
their costs. The voters know this, so they have no incentives to deviate and always reward
incumbents according to the chosen rules.
1.2.4 Equilibrium
First, consider one stage game. Let the voters use evaluation rules (i; bi) such that bi =
aei + ia
e
j . Under these rules the politician is utility is
i (ai; aj)  a
2
i
2
=8>><>>:
P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + Si P
 
pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj
	  a2i2 if S
P (fpi (ai) + ipj (aj)  big) + Di
 
1  P  pj (aj) + jpi (ai)  bj	  a2i2 if D:
Politician i chooses e¤ort ai before observing realization of the noise, and takes the
votersexpectations as given. Figure 2 depicts the politiciansbest response functions for
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Figure 2: Best response functions of politicians i and j for independent reelections (black),
positively correlated reelections (red) and negatively correlated reelections (blue) in states
S and D.
independent reelections with i = 0 and j = 0 (in black), positively correlated reelections
with i > 0 and j > 0 (in red) and negatively correlated reelections with i < 0 and
j < 0 (in blue) for states S and D. Note that for independent reelections (in black) the
best responses are at in both states (since each politicians reelection depends only on her
own e¤ort). For positively correlated reelections (in red) the best responses shift upwards
in state S and downwards in state D. Intuitively, under positively correlated reelections
a politician has extra incentives to exert e¤ort in state S (to increase her allys reelection
chances) and less incentives in state D (not to help her rival to get reelected). Finally, for
negatively correlated reelections (in blue) the best responses shift downwards in state S
and upwards in state D. Indeed, under negatively correlated reelections a politician does
not want to damage her allys reelection prospects and thus exert a lower e¤ort in state
S. She has however extra incentives to exert e¤ort in state D to cut her rivals reelection
chances. Note that there is a free-riding e¤ect under positively correlated reelections in
state S. Intuitively, politician i might prefer to exert a lower e¤ort (and save the e¤ort
cost) if her partisan ally j performs well enough to help her to be reelected.
The result below establishes the existence of an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies. Proofs
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of this and other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Under linear performance evaluation rules M and G with MG  1,
there exists an equilibrium in e¤ort strategies (aeM ; a
e
G) given by
aei =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
+
Si jq
1+2j
!
if S
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
  
D
i jq
1+2j
!
if D;
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j.
Turn now to the voterschoice of evaluation rules M and G. Maximizing a
e
M + a
e
G
with respect to M and G yields an equilibrium in rule strategies (

M ; 

G). I summarize
the results in the following proposition (the proof is straightforward).
Proposition 2 There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies (M ; 

G) given by
i =
8>><>>:
Sj if S
 Dj if D;
(1)
where i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j. The politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai are equal to
ai =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1q
1+(Sj )
2
+
(Si )
2q
1+(Si )
2
!
if S
1p
2
 
1q
1+(Dj )
2
+
(Di )
2q
1+(Di )
2
!
if D:
(2)
According to Proposition 2, if politician j is loyal to her political party (i.e., j 6= 0),
the voters adopt a joint performance evaluation rule to reelect politician i. The probability
of being reelected to o¢ ce i under the joint rule is equal to
Pri (ai; aj) =
8>><>>:
P
n
pi (ai) + 
S
j pj (aj)  ai + Sj aj
o
if S
P
n
pi (ai)  Dj pj (aj)  ai   Dj aj
o
if D:
Intuitively, the incentives of a mayor and governor are correlated, because they care about
the overall representation of their party in both o¢ ces. The voters therefore reward politi-
cians jointly rather than separately.
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If the politicians belong to the same political party (state S), then the voters use a joint
rule under which the reelection of politician i is positively correlated with the performance
of politician j (i > 0). As a result, the voters evaluate the performance of the politicians
from the same party as a team and tend to reward the incumbents from a well-performing
party while punish the incumbents from a badly-performing party.
However, if the politicians belong to di¤erent parties (state D), the voters use a joint
rule under which the reelection of politician i is negatively correlated with the performance
of politician j (i < 0). As a result, the voters compare the performance of one politician to
that of the other, creating a competitive environment between the parties. In this scenario
the voters tend to reward the incumbent from the better-performing party, while punishing
the incumbent from the worse-performing party.
In sum, due to the correlation between the mayors and governorincentives such that
they care about their party chances of holding o¢ ce, the voters are better o¤ adopting party
performance evaluation rather than individual performance evaluation.
Furthermore, the more loyal politician j is to her political party (the higher j is),
the more correlated the optimal reward scheme for politician i is with the performance of
politician j (positively if S or negatively if D). Intuitively, if the politicians care equally
about their own reelection chances and their partys election chances, then the best reward
scheme would be perfectly correlated: in state S the incumbents are always reelected or
dismissed together, while in state D reelection of one implies dismissal of the other.
The less loyal the politicians are to their political parties, the less correlated their in-
centives. As a result, the voters adopt the less correlated reelection rules in equilibrium.
If politician j is not at all loyal to her political party (j = 0), then the optimal rule to
reappoint politician i is a simple cut-o¤ rule: she is reappointed only if her observed per-
formance exceeds a critical threshold given by the equilibrium e¤ort for this o¢ ce. That is,
the probability of being reelected to o¢ ce i depends only on ai:
Pri (ai) = P (fpi (ai)  ai g) :
Intuitively, when politicians care only about their own reelection prospects, the voters are
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better o¤rewarding politicians individual performance rather than the partys performance.
Next, compare the equilibrium e¤orts of politicians from the same party and from di¤er-
ent parties, as given in (2). If there is some preference for incumbents (i.e., Si  Di ) then
politicians from the same party exert a higher total e¤ort than politicians from di¤erent
parties:
(aM + a

G) jS  (aM + aG) jD if SM  DM and SG  DG :
Intuitively, politicians from the same party are more loyal to their political parties than
politicians from di¤erent parties, so the former have extra incentives to exert a higher e¤ort
(in order to increase the probability of their counterparts reelection). If a mayor and
governor prefer newcomers (i.e., Si < 
D
i ) then politicians from the same party have less
incentives to perform well. So politicians from the same party exert a lower total e¤ort than
politicians from di¤erent parties:
(aM + a

G) jS < (aM + aG) jD if SM < DM and SG < DG :
How do the equilibrium e¤orts ai in (2) depend on parametersvalues? First, larger
variance of noise 2 decreases the politicianse¤orts. Intuitively, more randomness in the
observed performances pM and pG makes the reelection probabilities less sensitive to ef-
fort, reducing the politicians incentives. Second, if politician is party alignment i is
strengthened, the equilibrium e¤ort of politician i, ai increases while that of politician j,
aj decreases. The more politician i cares about her allys appointment to o¢ ce j, the more
incentives she has to perform better. However, this weakens politician js incentives to exert
e¤ort, because his reelection becomes less sensitive to his own e¤ort.
In the innitely repeated game, one can show that there exists a Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium such that in each stage the votersrule strategies are given by (1) and the politicians
e¤orts are given by (2).
1.2.5 Dynamics
In this section I calculate the equilibrium probabilities of transition between state S (where
the politicians are members of the same party) and state D (where the politicians belong
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to di¤erent parties). I denote by Pkl the probability that a city in state k will shift to state
l in the next period, k; l 2 fS;Dg. I establish the following result.
Proposition 3 The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabilities between states
S and D is 264PSS PSD
PDS PDD
375 =
264 12 + 1 arctan 
S
M+
S
G
1 SMSG
1
2   1 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
1
2 +
1
 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
1
2   1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
375
where arctan () is the arctangent function.
Note that independently of the current state, the next state is more likely to be S than
D. Indeed, the probability of the next state being a split-ticket state is never greater than
1
2 : PD 2

0; 12

. The intuition for this result is as follows. If the politicians currently
belong to the same party (state S), the voters adopt a joint rule under which the reelection
outcomes are positively correlated: the incumbents are more likely to be reelected together
or dismissed together than they are to receive opposite rewards. Thus, the next state is
more likely to be S. If the politicians are currently members of di¤erent parties (state
D), then the voters use a joint rule under which the reelection outcomes are negatively
correlated. Thus, it is more likely that one incumbent will be dismissed while the other is
reelected, and again the next state is more likely to be S than D. To conrm this intuition,
in Figure 3 I depict the politiciansreelection outcomes under equilibrium rules M and 

G
in the two-dimensional space of performances pM and pG. The density function of the joint
distribution of pM and pG is symmetric around (aM ; a

G).
Furthermore, independently of the current state, the probability PD that the next state
will be D is decreasing in M and 

G. This probability takes its minimal value of 0 when
M = 

G = 1, and its maximal value of
1
2 when 

M = 

G = 0. Intuitively, the more loyal
politicians are to their parties, the more correlated (positively if S or negatively if D) the
optimal performance evaluation rules. The outcome S is more probable for both current
states, as explained above, so stronger party loyalty just increases the probability of this
outcome.
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Figure 3: Politiciansreelection outcomes under equilibrium rules M and 

G in states S
and D.
How does the current state a¤ect the probability that the next state is state k, k 2
fS;Dg? First, if politicians prefer incumbents (Si  Di ) then PDD  PSD and PSS  PDS ;
although S is always more likely than D, the next state is more likely to be k if the current
state is k. Intuitively, due to the politicians preference for incumbents, the politicians
incentives are more correlated in state S than in state D. The voters are therefore more
likely to adopt positively correlated reelection rules in S than negatively correlated rules
in D. While both states are more likely to shift to S in the next period, this S outcome
is more likely to occur if the current state is S. By the same logic, a D outcome is more
likely if the current state is D than if the current state is S. Second, if politicians prefer
newcomers (Si < 
D
i ) then PDD < PSD and PSS < PDS . Here the politiciansincentives
are more correlated in state D than in state S. Thus, the joint reelection rules are more
correlated (in absolute value) in state D than in state S. So state S is more likely to occur
if the current state is D, while state D is more likely to occur if the current state is S.
Recall that state S or state D occurs when the voters did not split or split tickets
respectively. I conclude that in this simultaneous elections framework, ticket splitting is
less likely than voting for candidates from the same party (i.e., PD  PS). Moreover,
the probability of split-ticket voting depends on ticket splitting in the previous period. If
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politicians prefer incumbents then the voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous
period they also split tickets, i.e.,
PDD  PSD if SM  DM and SG  DG :
If politicians prefer newcomers then the voters are more likely to split tickets if in the
previous period they did not split ticket, i.e.,
PDD < PSD if SM < 
D
M and 
S
G < 
D
G :
1.3 Ticket Splitting in a Region with Small Municipalities
In this section I assume that a region consists of n municipalities, and that each is pivotal
for the outcome of the regional election with some small probability. The main insights
and intuitions of the large city case (Section 1.2) do not change qualitatively. Still, some
novel results arise. This section stresses the novel assumptions and results, referring to the
previous analysis whenever appropriate.
The model is identical to that presented in Section 1.2, except for the following changes.
The region consists of n municipalities with population shares i,
Pn
i=1 i = 1. At the
beginning of each period the voters in municipality i elect mayor Mi and vote for governor
G in the simultaneous elections. The probability that municipality i is pivotal for the
outcome of the regional election is equal to its population share i. While in o¢ ce, mayors
Mi and governor G implement policies which are determined by their unobservable e¤orts
ai and aG respectively. The performances pi and pG are observed with independent and
unobservable noises "i and "G respectively:
pi = ai + "i
pG = aG + "G
with "i,"G  N
 
0; 2

, i = 1; :::; n.
Mayor Mi chooses e¤ort ai to maximize her utility, given by
i (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2
=
8>><>>:
Pri (ai; aG) + 
S
i PrG (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2 if Si
Pri (ai; aG) + 
D
i (1  PrG (ai; aG))  a
2
i
2 if Di;
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where Si and Di denote the states where mayor Mi and governor G are members of the
same party or di¤erent parties as before. This utility function implies that the mayor is
o¢ ce-motivated and prefers the governor to be a politician from the same party. The results
do not change if I extend the mayors partisan preferences to include all other mayors in
the region.
Governor G is also o¢ ce-motivated and loyal to her political party. She prefers to see
members of her own party in all the o¢ ces M1; :::;Mn. However, I assume that a governor
cares more about her partys election chances in larger cities. In other words, the larger
the population of the city, the more the governor wants its mayor to be a member of her
own political party. This assumption reects the idea that party a¢ liation might be of
less importance in smaller municipalities, either because candidates are more likely to run
as independents (or be a¢ liated with a minor party) or because the voters have personal
knowledge of the candidates for mayor o¢ ce. Recall that one of the major roles of political
parties is to provide information about unknown politicians. Formally,
G (a1; :::; an; aG)  a
2
G
2
= PrG (a1; :::; an; aG) + 
S
G
nX
i=1
iIiPri (ai; aG) +
DG
nX
i=1
i (1  Ii) (1  Pri (ai; aG)) 
a2G
2
:
Ii is the indicator function of state Si, dened as
Ii =
8>><>>:
1 if Si
0 if Di:
The voters in municipality i care about the politicians performances in each period
according to a linear utility function
pi + pG;
where pi and pG are observable at the end of each period. The voters coordinate in choosing
a linear performance evaluation rule (i; bi) to reward mayor Mi, and a linear rule
 
Gi ; b
G
i

to reward governor G. The probability that mayor Mi is reelected equals
Pri (ai; aG) = P (fpi (ai) + ipG (aG)  big) :
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As for the governor, I assume that each municipality i has a probability equal to its pop-
ulation share i to be pivotal in the regional election. The probability that governor G is
reelected is therefore additively separable, and equal to a weighted sum of the probabilities
of getting a majority in each municipality. Each municipalitys term is weighted with its
population share:
PrG (a1; :::; an; aG) =
nX
i=1
iP
 
pG (aG) + 
G
i pi (ai)  bGi
	
:
I skip the equilibrium denitions and the discussion, which are analogous to the large
city model in Section 1.2. Next, I characterize the equilibrium in rule strategies in the case
of n small municipalities.
Proposition 4 There exists an equilibrium in rule strategies
 
i ; 
G
i

i = 1; :::; n, given
by
i =
8>><>>:
i
S
G if Si
 iDG if Di
and Gi =
8>><>>:
Si if Si
 Di if Di:
The politiciansequilibrium e¤orts ai ; a

G are equal to
ai =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1q
1+(iSG)
2
+
i(Si )
2q
1+(Si )
2
!
if Si
1p
2
 
1q
1+(iDG)
2
+
i(Di )
2q
1+(Di )
2
!
if Di
aG =
1p
2
nX
i=1
i
0@ 1q
1 +
 
Si
2
Ii +
 
Di
2
(1  Ii)
+
i
 
SG
2
Ii +
 
DG
2
(1  Ii)

q
1 +
 
i
S
G
2
Ii +
 
i
D
G
2
(1  Ii)
1A :
The equilibrium analysis and intuition for the case of n small municipalities do not di¤er
qualitatively from the large city case presented in Section 1.2. The only new prediction is
that the correlation (positive in state Si or negative in state Di) between the optimal reward
rules for mayorMi and governor G is stronger in large cities than in small cities. Intuitively,
the larger the municipality, the more the governor wants its mayor to belong to the same
party, so the more correlated the politiciansincentives. As a result, the more the voters
correlate (positively if Si or negatively if Di) the optimal reward rule for mayor Mi with
performance of governor G to motivate the latter to exert higher e¤ort.
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I turn now to a dynamic analysis of ticket splitting in small municipalities, which reveals
more novel insights. Consider a municipality that splits tickets in the current period, i.e.,
the voters elect a mayor from one party and vote for a governor from the other party.
This does not necessarily imply the election of the citys preferred governor, since each
municipality has only a small probability of swaying the regional election. Thus, ticket
splitting in municipality i does not necessarily result in the state Di where mayor and
governor are members of di¤erent parties. Note that in the large city model, ticket splitting
always leads to state D.
I nd the equilibrium probabilities of transition between the ticket-splitting and non
ticket-splitting states in municipality i. I denote by Yi the state where voters in municipality
i split tickets (Y stands for "yes"), and by Ni the state where voters in municipality i do
not split tickets (N stands for "no"). I denote by qi the probability that the governor who
wins a majority in municipality i is actually elected. In other words, probability qi is equal
to the probability that an incumbent governor gets the majority in municipality i and is
also reelected, plus the probability that an incumbent governor does not get the majority
in municipality i and is not reelected. I now establish the following result.
Proposition 5 The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabilities between states
Ni and Yi is 264PNiNi PNiYi
PYiNi PYiYi
375
where
PNiYi =
1
2
  1


qi arctan
Si + i
S
G
1  iSi SG
+ (1  qi) arctan 
D
i + i
D
G
1  iDi DG

PYiYi =
1
2
  1


qi arctan
Di + i
D
G
1  iDi DG
+ (1  qi) arctan 
S
i + i
S
G
1  iSi SG

with
qi = 1  1

X
j 6=i
j arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
:
Proposition 5 generalizes the dynamic predictions of the large city case studied in Section
1.2. In analogy with previous results, the next state is more likely to be non ticket-splitting
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state Ni than ticket-splitting state Yi regardless of the current state, since PYi  12 . Fur-
thermore, if politicians prefer incumbents (Si  Di and SG  DG) then the municipality is
more likely to split tickets if in the previous period it also split tickets (PYiYi  PNiYi). In
case politicians prefer newcomers (Si < 
D
i and 
S
G < 
D
G) then the municipality is more
likely to split tickets if in the previous period it did not split tickets (PYiYi < PNiYi).
The following result arises only in the small-city model. According to Proposition 5,
ticket splitting is more likely to happen in small municipalities than in large ones regardless
of the current state. The probabilities PNiYi and PYiYi are decreasing functions of the
population share i. Intuitively, a governor cares less about the party a¢ liation of small-
town mayors. As the politiciansincentives are less correlated in small municipalities than in
large ones, the voters adopt less correlated joint performance evaluation rules. As a result,
the incumbents are more likely to be evaluated according to their individual performance,
which increases the probability of ticket splitting.
I summarize these ndings in the following corollary.
Corollary 6 1. Regardless of the current state, ticket splitting is less likely than voting
for candidates from the same party.
2. The probability of split-ticket voting depends on ticket splitting in the previous period.
3. Ticket splitting is more likely in small municipalities than in large ones.
In the next section I show that the predictions of Corollary 6 are consistent with ticket
splitting patterns in Spain.
1.4 Empirical Model
The goal of this section is to estimate the probability of ticket splitting and show that the
predictions of Corollary 6 are consistent with the patterns of ticket splitting observed in
Spain. I use an unbalanced panel data set on simultaneous municipal and regional elections
held in Spain in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 and 2007.10
10One might be concerned whether the majoritarian model presented here is applicable to the empirical
context, since Spanish regional elections use a proportional representation system. In response, I stress that
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I apply the binary response model, which employs a probit link function. A logit model
yields the same qualitative results. However, the probit model is more consistent with my
theoretical framework, where reelections are determined by normally distributed noise.11
Denote by yit a binary variable that takes value 1 if municipality i splits tickets in
period t, and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, i stands for municipality is population share, xit
for control variables, r for region e¤ects (where r denotes the region that municipality i
belongs to) and t for year e¤ects. The theoretical model suggests the following structure
for the estimating equation:
P (yit = 1ji; yit 1; xit; r; t) =  (0 + 1i + 2yit 1 + 3xit + r + t) ;
where  () denotes the cumulative function of the standard normal distribution. The region
e¤ects and year e¤ects are included as dummies.
Since the specication does not include time invariant municipality e¤ects, I can esti-
mate the model by pooling all the cross sections. Otherwise, in order to obtain consistent
estimates I would have to apply either random e¤ects or xed e¤ects estimation methods.
This would not be straightforward, given the non-linear nature of the model.
Before proceeding, I will discuss what e¤ects are expected in the empirical analysis.
According to Corollary 6 ticket splitting is more likely in smaller municipalities, which
suggests 1 < 0. The e¤ect of ticket splitting in the previous period should be reected by
2 6= 0. Finally, I hypothesize that the predicted probability of ticket splitting is less than
0:5: bP (yit = 1) < 0:5.
1.4.1 Data Description
In Spain, local municipal and regional elections occur simultaneously every four years in 13
out of 17 regions (the so-called autonomous communities).12 The two leading parties are
in Spain, the regional leader of the party that gets the most seats in the regional Legislative Assembly is
usually elected as a president of the corresponding autonomous community. As such, ordinary citizens often
regard the regional election as a way of determining the president of their autonomous community, rather
than an election of their representatives.
11The maximum likelihood estimation yields the same qualitative results.
12Municipal and regional elections take place simultaneously in Aragon, Principality of Asturias, Balearic
Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Castile-La Mancha, Castile and León, Extremadura, La Rioja, Commu-
nity of Madrid, Region of Murcia, Foral Community of Navarre and Valencian Community. In Andalusia,
Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, municipal and regional elections are held on di¤erent dates.
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Partido Popular (PP) and Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE).13 To build the data
set I use the aggregate election results of 10 Spanish regions, which are partially available
online at the o¢ cial websites of the regional governments and the Spanish Ministry of the
Interior.14
The sample consists of 3218 municipalities, and depending on the region, covers from
4 to 7 election years from 1983 to 2007. Initially, each observation (of municipality i in
election year t) includes a census, the number of abstainers, the votes for PP, the votes for
PSOE, and the votes for other parties in both municipal and regional elections.
In the theoretical analysis I assumed that all voters participate in both municipal and
regional elections. To meet this requirement, from the initial sample I discard all observa-
tions where the number of voters in municipal elections di¤ers signicantly from the number
of voters in regional elections (the maximum allowable di¤erence is 5%). This ensures that
almost the same electorate participated in both elections. Next, I exclude all observations
where a third party obtained more votes than either PP or PSOE, in either the municipal
or regional elections. All observations thus have the same two leading parties, in line with
the theoretical model. Then I dene the binary variable yit such that yit = 1 if di¤erent
parties obtained the largest number of votes in the municipal and regional elections (ticket
splitting) and yit = 0 if the same party received the largest number of votes in both elections
(no ticket splitting).
I use the census share of municipality i in a region during the last observed election year
as a proxy for the population share i. The per capita GDP by province (in thousands of
euros) serves as the control variable xit.15 Table 3 and Figure 4 in the Appendix provide
descriptive statistics and characteristics of the nal sample.
13There are also several minor parties; for example, Izquierda Unida has considerable support in some
regions.
14Some data were kindly provided by the statistical institutes of the corresponding regions, and are
available upon request. The community of Castile and León is not included in my analysis because the data
on regional elections in this community are not available. The Canary Islands and the Foral Community of
Navarre are not included in the data set, because local parties apart from PP and PSOE enjoy widespread
support in these regions and the theoretical model assumes just two political parties.
15 In Spain, provinces are administrative subdivisions of autonomous communities. In turn, municipalities
are subdivisions of provinces.
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P (ticket splitting in i at t) = P (yit= 1)
(1) (2) (3)
Pop. share, 1 -2.544
 -2.616 -2.793
(1.332) (1.309) (1.456)
TS in t  1, 2 0.734 0.734 0.741
(0.043) (0.043) (0.04)
Observations 4183 4183 4177
Robust standard errors clustered by region in parentheses. S ign icant at 10%

; 5%

; 1%

(1)  only region dumm ies; (2)  region dumm ies and year dumm ies; (3)  region-year dumm ies.
Table 1: Ticket splitting (TS) and municipality population share.
obs. mean std. dev. min max std. err. 95% conf. intervalbP (yit = 1) 4183 0.193 0.106 0.006 0.487 0.002 0.190 0.196
Table 2: Summary statistics of the predicted probability of ticket splitting bP (yit = 1).
1.4.2 Empirical Results
Table 1 presents the coe¢ cients of interest in the panel regressions. The rst regression in-
cludes only region dummies. The second regression includes both region and year dummies.
In the third regression, the region dummies are interacted with each year dummy.
First, consider coe¢ cient 1 for the population share. It is signicantly negative in all
specications. I conclude that ticket splitting is more likely to occur in smaller municipal-
ities, as predicted. Second, coe¢ cient 2 for the e¤ect of ticket splitting in the previous
period is signicantly positive in all specications. This result shows that in the sample
ticket splitting is more likely in municipalities where the voters split tickets in the previous
period.
Finally, Table 2 presents summary statistics of the predicted probability of ticket split-
ting bP (yit = 1) in the second regression, which includes both region and year dummies.
The maximal predicted probability does not exceed 0.5 and is equal to 0.487. So I conclude
that ticket splitting is less likely than partisan voting.
In sum, the predictions of the theoretical model, which are summarized in Corollary
6, are consistent with these empirical ndings on the dynamics of simultaneous two-party
elections.
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1.5 Conclusion
This paper applies an implicit incentive approach to study split-ticket voting in simultaneous
municipal and regional elections. In a political agency model with moral hazard, ticket
splitting is a natural outcome of the optimal implicit reward schemes that voters use to
motivate the politicianse¤orts.
I assume that incentives of local and regional politicians are correlated, as a mayor/governor
prefers her counterpart (the governor/mayor) to be a¢ liated with the same political party.
Voters thus are better o¤ adopting a joint performance evaluation rule rather than individ-
ual performance evaluation rules to reward the incumbents. These rules a¤ect the dynamics
of split-ticket voting. In particular, the model suggests that ticket splitting is less likely than
voting for candidates from the same party. Moreover, the probability of split-ticket voting
depends on ticket-splitting in the previous period. Finally, ticket splitting is more likely
in smaller municipalities where the party a¢ liation of a mayor is assumed to be of less
importance to the governor. These results are consistent with empirical evidence obtained
from Spanish elections where voters are more likely to split tickets if in the previous period
they also did so.
I have focused on single task policies. However, in reality public policies pursue many
goals. So it is of interest to study split-ticket voting under a more realistic assumption of
multiple-task policy where the problem of e¤ort allocation among tasks can create policy
trade-o¤s. To rene the empirical results, one could apply other estimation methods such
as a Markov switching model. It would also be interesting to examine data from other
countries where municipal and regional elections are held simultaneously. I leave these
tasks for future research.
1.6 Appendix
Throughout the Appendix, I use F to denote the normal distribution function and f for
the corresponding density.
28
Proof of Proposition 1. Under linear performance evaluation rules (i; bi) the prob-
ability of being reelected for o¢ ce i is
Pri (ai; aj) = P (f"i + i"j  bi   ai   iajg) = 1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) ;
where noises "i and "j (i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j) are independent normally distributed random
variables, so by the convolution formula "i+i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

. Politician is utility
is
i (ai; aj)  a
2
i
2
=8>><>>:
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + Si

1  F"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if S
1  F"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + Di F"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  a2i2 if D:
The rst-order conditions with respect to actual e¤ort ai, taking bi = aei + ia
e
j and bj =
aej + ja
e
i as given, are8>><>>:
f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj) + Si jf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if S
f"i+i"j (bi   ai   iaj)  Di jf"j+j"i
 
bj   aj   jai
  ai = 0 if D:
Imposing the equilibrium requirement ai = aei yields
aei =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
+
Si jq
1+2j
!
if S
1p
2
 
1p
1+2i
  
D
i jq
1+2j
!
if D;
which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. The reelection of incumbent i is determined by random
variable "i + i"j  N
 
0;
 
1 + 2i

2

, i; j 2 fM;Gg, i 6= j. The density function of
bivariate normal distribution of random variables "M + M"G and "G + G"M , denoted by
f"M+M"G;"G+G"M (x; y), is
f"M+M"G;"G+G"M (x; y) =
1
22
q
(MG   1)2
exp
(
 (x  yM )
2 + (y   xG)2
22 (MG   1)2
)
:
The transition from state k back to state k, k 2 fS;Dg, occurs either when both incumbents
are reappointed or when none of them is reappointed (so, opponents from rival parties are
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elected). Denote by pi = a

i + "i the performance of politician i in equilibrium. The
equilibrium transition probabilities are
PSS = P
 
pM + 
S
Gp

G  aM + SGaG
	 \ pG + SMpM  aG + SMaM	+
P
 
pM + 
S
Gp

G < a

M + 
S
Ga

G
	 \ pG + SMpM < aG + SMaM	 =
P
 
"M + 
S
G"G  0
	 \ "G + SM"M  0	+
P
 
"M + 
S
G"G < 0
	 \ "G + SM"M < 0	 =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"M+SG"G;"G+
S
M"M
(x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"M+SG"G;"G+
S
M"M
(x; y) dxdy =
1
2 +
1
 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
PDD = P
 
pM   DGpG  aM   DGaG
	 \ pG   DMpM  aG   DMaM	+
P
 
pM   DGpG < aM   DGaG
	 \ pG   DMpM < aG   DMaM	 =
P
 
"M   DG"G  0
	 \ "G   DM"M  0	+
P
 
"M   DG"G < 0
	 \ "G   DM"M < 0	 =
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"M DG"G;"G DM"M (x; y) dxdy +
0Z
 1
0Z
 1
f"M DG"G;"G DM"M (x; y) dxdy =
1
2   1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
PSD = 1  PSS = 12   1 arctan
SM+
S
G
1 SMSG
PDS = 1  PDD = 12 + 1 arctan
DM+
D
G
1 DMDG
;
where arctan () is an arctangent function.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under linear performance evaluation rules (i; bi) and 
Gi ; b
G
i

, i = 1; :::; n, mayor Mis utility is
i (ai; aG)  a
2
i
2
=8>><>>:
1  F"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Si
Pn
j=1 j

1  F"G+Gj "j

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  a2i2 if Si
1  F"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Di
Pn
j=1 jF"G+Gj "j

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  a2i2 if Di:
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The rst-order conditions with respect to actual e¤ort ai, taking bi = aei + ia
e
G and b
G
j =
aeG + 
G
j a
e
j as given, are8>><>>:
f"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG) + Si iGi f"G+Gi "i

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  ai = 0 if Si
f"i+i"G (bi   ai   iaG)  Di iGi f"G+Gi "i

bGj   aG   Gj aj

  ai = 0 if Di:
I impose the equilibrium requirements ai = aei and aG = a
e
G to get mayor Mis equilibrium
e¤ort strategy
aei =
8>>><>>>:
1p
2

1p
1+2i
+
Si i
G
ip
1+G2i

if Si
1p
2

1p
1+2i
  Di iGip
1+G2i

if Di:
Next, consider governor Gs utility:
G (a1; :::; an; aG)  a
2
G
2
=
nX
j=1
j

1  F"G+Gj "j
 
bGj   aG   Gj aj

+
SG
nX
j=1
Ijj

1  F"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG

+ DG
nX
j=1
(1  Ij) jF"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
  a2G
2
:
The rst-order condition with respect to actual e¤ort aG, taking bj = aej + ja
e
G and
bGj = a
e
G + 
G
j a
e
j as given, yields
nX
j=1
jf"G+Gj "j
 
bGj   aG   Gj aj

+ SG
nX
j=1
Ijjjf"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
 
DG
nX
j=1
(1  Ij) jjf"j+j"G
 
bj   aj   jaG
  aG = 0:
Imposing the equilibrium requirements aj = aej (j = 1; :::; n) and aG = a
e
G yields governor
Gs equilibrium e¤ort strategy
aeG =
1p
2
nX
j=1
j
0@ 1q
1 + G2j
+
j
 
SGIj   DG (1  Ij)
q
1 + 2j
1A :
Finally, maximizing aei+a
e
G with respect to i and 
G
i yields an equilibrium in rule strategies 
i ; 
G
i

and politicians equilibrium e¤orts ai = a
e
i
 
i ; 
G
i

and aG = a
e
G
 
i ; 
G
i

,
which completes the proof.
31
Proof of Proposition 5. The matrix of the equilibrium one-step transition probabili-
ties between states Ni and Yi equals264PNiNi PNiYi
PYiNi PYiYi
375 =
264qiPSiNi + (1  qi)PDiNi qiPSiYi + (1  qi)PDiYi
qiPDiNi + (1  qi)PSiNi qiPDiYi + (1  qi)PSiYi
375
Refer to the proof of Proposition 3 to nd transition probabilities to states Ni and Yi from
states Si and Di:
PSiNi =
1
2 +
1
 arctan
Si +i
S
G
1 iSi SG
and PSiYi =
1
2   1 arctan
Si +i
S
G
1 iSi SG
PDiNi =
1
2 +
1
 arctan
Di +i
D
G
1 iDi DG
and PDiYi =
1
2   1 arctan
Di +i
D
G
1 iDi DG
:
Next,
qi = P (fG gets majority in ig \ fG is reelectedg)+
P (fG does not get majority in ig \ fG is not reelectedg) =
2
nX
j=1
jP
 
pG + 
G
i p

i  aG + Gi ai
	 \ pG + Gj pj  aG + Gj aj	 =
2
nX
j=1
jP
 
"G + 
G
i "i  0
	 \ "G + Gj "j  0	 =
i + 2
X
j 6=i
j
+1Z
0
+1Z
0
f"G+Gi "i;"G+Gj "j
(x; y) dxdy;
where f"G+Gi "i;"G+Gj "j (x; y) is the density function of bivariate normal distribution of
random variables "G + Gi "i and "G + 
G
j "j . Finally,
qi = i +
X
j 6=i
j

1  1

arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
=
1  1

X
j 6=i
j arctan
q 
Gi
2
+
 
Gj
2
+
 
Gi 
G
j
2
;
which completes the proof.
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yit i xit
mun. years obs. m ean std . obs. m ean std . m ax obs. m ean std .
Region dev. dev. dev.
A ragon 731 87-07 1084 0.16 0.37 4386 0.001 0.019 0.50 4380 14.14 5.74
Asturias 78 83-07 334 0.11 0.31 546 0.013 0.037 0.25 546 10.45 5.39
Balearic Islands 67 95-07 95 0.20 0.40 268 0.015 0.046 0.38 268 18.78 3.92
Cantabria 102 87-03 140 0.19 0.39 510 0.010 0.035 0.34 510 10.99 4.29
Castile-La Mancha 919 87-07 2299 0.24 0.43 5514 0.001 0.004 0.08 5512 11.17 4.23
Extremadura 382 83-99 1019 0.10 0.30 1910 0.003 0.008 0.12 1909 5.76 2.50
La R io ja 174 87-03 390 0.19 0.39 870 0.006 0.037 0.48 870 14.06 6.54
Com . of M adrid 179 91-07 458 0.19 0.39 895 0.006 0.039 0.52 895 19.49 6.52
Region of Murcia 45 91-07 199 0.12 0.33 225 0.022 0.049 0.31 225 12.55 3.84
Valencian Com . 541 95-07 1291 0.21 0.41 2164 0.002 0.009 0.17 2148 15.71 3.82
Whole sample 3218 7309 0.19 0.39 17288 0.003 0.020 0.52 17263 12.57 5.82
Table 3: Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics.
Figure 4: Percentage of split-ticket voting (ST) in the regions included in the sample.
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CHAPTER II
SINCERE LOBBYING FORMATION
2.1 Introduction
The literature claims that wealthy citizens inuence policy disproportionately because the
willingness of the rich to make higher campaign contributions than the poor causes policy-
makers to adopt positions the rich prefer (see, for example, Domho¤ 1983 and Mills 1956,
and, for the more recent contribution, Glazer and Gradstein 2005). However, in the ranking
of the "Top 50" US political action committees (PACs) by contributions to candidates in
1999-2000 there are PACs listed whose members are more likely to be "poor" rather than
"rich": LaborersPolitical League, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Com-
mittee on Political Education, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America,
etc.1 Thus, the poor take an active part in lobbying to bias policy in their favor. Campante
and Ferreira (2007) show that lobbying does favor the poor in the case where they have a
comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. However, I believe that the
core of the problem is to model a decision rule that individuals use to decide whether to
participate in lobbying or not. The aim of this paper is to build a tractable framework to
explain this phenomenon analyzing individualsdecision to take part in lobbying activities.
The most prevalent formal literature approach builds on the assumption that lobbies
inuence political decisions through contributions (see Baron 1989, Becker 1983, 1985, Sny-
der 1990). The reviews of this and alternative approaches can be found in Austen-Smith
(1997), Grossman and Helpman (2001), and Persson and Tabellini (2002). One wonders
why some special interest groups have organized into lobbies and others have not. Olson
(1971) identied some important issues of the problem. On the one hand, individuals with
similar policy preferences can jointly inuence policy outcome. On the other hand, there
1Data from the Federal Election Committee. Available online at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2001/053101pacfund/053101pacfund.html (accessed January 23, 2008).
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is always the strong temptation to free ride. Unfortunately, to solve a free-riding problem
with a large number of individuals one needs to use coalition formation theory that proves
to be very complicated. So the recent literature has addressed the question of lobbying
formation in di¤erent contexts. Some authors focus mainly on formation of lobbies from
exogenously given special interest groups (see Drazen et al. 2007, Felli and Merlo 2006,
2007, Laussel 2006 and Mitra 1999). Others address the problem of individuals choice
to lobby in some way. For example, Damania and Fredriksson (2000, 2003) and Magee
(2002) analyze incentives for two rms and for n identical rms, respectively, to organize
into a single industry lobby to a¤ect policy outcomes. In turn, Bombardini (2008) proposes
"Optimal Lobby Criterion" that reads: it is optimal for a rm to "join the lobby" if the
joint surplus of a perspective member rm and the lobby is higher under rm participa-
tion. Glazer and Gradstein (2005) study the heterogeneous individualsdecision to make
campaign contributions and show that people who contribute the most are extremists.
I develop a model of special interest politics analyzing individuals decision to participate
in lobbying to inuence public goods provision. I study complete information model with
one-dimensional policy space. The incumbent government, which is either utilitarian or
pro-median, cares about its utility and lobbies contribution payments. Individuals are
assumed to be heterogeneous in income, and I refer to low-income individuals as the poor
and to high-income individuals as the rich. Accordingly, two lobbies can be organized: the
lobby of the poor and the lobby of the rich. Moreover, I assume that there is no cost of
forming lobbies and the lobbying mechanism is modeled as a common-agency problem à la
Grossman and Helpman (1994). In equilibrium each individual either belongs to one of the
two lobbies or does not participate in lobbying activities. I propose an intuitive condition
for equilibrium termed sincere lobbying formation: an equilibrium occurs only if no lobby
member would prefer her lobby to stop existing. This condition is obviously a necessary
condition for equilibrium. Note that Alesina and Rosenthals conditional sincerity condition
for voter equilibrium applies a similar concept in voting context (see Alesina and Rosenthal
1995, 1996).
Why will individuals behave sincerely forming lobby groups rather than be involved in
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free-riding? One possible explanation could be that individuals simply enjoy participating
in special interest politics, unless they cannot a¤ord it. In light of this fact, individuals
may gain some personal satisfaction from showing allegiance to their special interest group.
Another possible answer captures the idea of social norm individual behavior, that is, in-
dividuals take part in lobbying activities (unless they are better o¤ without any lobby),
because it is a social norm of the society. In other words, the social norm may advise:
one should join a lobby if the gain one gets from lobbying activities is higher than the fee
one is to pay as a lobby member. Alternatively, one can think of an ethical society where
individuals bear a very high psychological cost if they engage in free-riding. So unless the
gain from free-riding is considerably high, citizens will refrain from free-riding to avoid this
psychological cost. In his turn, Smith (2000) in a systematical analysis of postwar lawmak-
ing, shows that the public does overcome free-riding problem in the issues that a¤ect the
interests of the majority of the population such as tax rates, air pollution, and product
liability.
I show that individuals with more extreme income levels are more likely to be involved
in lobbying activities. To be more specic, in equilibrium each lobby is characterized by a
threshold level of income such that all individuals with higher (for the lobby of the rich) or
lower (for the lobby of the poor) income participate in lobbying activities. This is in line
with the results of Glazer and Gradstein (2005) and McCarty et al. (2006) that extremists
want to contribute the most.
I solve the model numerically, assuming that the gross income has lognormal distribution
and using US gross income descriptive statistics from the Luxembourg Income Study. I nd
that the institute of lobbying does not necessarily favor wealthy citizens. On the contrary, in
the case of a utilitarian government the nal policy outcome favors the poor (in comparison
with the socially optimal one). Accordingly, the lobby of the poor is more numerous and
makes higher total campaign contributions than the lobby of the rich, while per member
contribution is greater in the lobby of the rich. For example, for the United States the
model predicts that the lobby of the poor is almost 4 times more numerous than the lobby
of the rich, total contributions of the poor are 1.08 times higher than total contributions of
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the rich, while each member of the lobby of the rich contributes 3.64 times more than each
member of the lobby of the poor.
In the case of a pro-median government my results are in line with the existing literature:
the nal policy outcome does favor the rich (in comparison with the one preferred by the
median voter). Although the lobby of the poor is more numerous, it contributes in total
and per member less than the lobby of the rich. For example, for the United States the
numerical results read: the lobby of the poor is more than twice the size of the lobby of
the rich, while total contributions of the rich are 3.56 times higher than the ones of the
poor, with each member of the lobby of the rich contributing almost 8 times more than
each member of the lobby of the poor.
So the conceptual di¤erence in my results comes from the assumptions on the government
preferences: under a utilitarian government lobbying favors the poor, while under a pro-
median government lobbying favors the rich. The reason for this is quite intuitive and due
to the fact that income distribution is recognized to be skewed to the right. Pro-median
government tends to satisfy the median voter preferences, while utilitarian government
implements the policy preferred by the individual with mean income. Therefore, under a
pro-median government, the rich have more stake in the policy and coordinate better, since
without lobbying the policy outcome is not in their favor. Accordingly, under a utilitarian
government, the poor have more stake in the policy and coordinate better, since the mean
individual preferred policy does not favor them. Still, with or without lobbying, the poor
would prefer a pro-median government to a utilitarian one, while the rich would prefer a
utilitarian government to a pro-median one.
If the government cares only about contribution payments all individuals participate
in lobbying: individuals with income lower than the mean one belong to the lobby of the
poor, and individuals with income higher than the mean one belong to the lobby of the rich.
This happens because individuals know that the only way to get favorable policy outcome
is lobbying: the government does not care about citizenswellbeing at all. In this case
political competition results in socially optimal outcome.
I analyze how the degree of income inequality in a society a¤ects the composition of
37
lobbies and the nal outcome in the equilibrium. The model predicts that the less egalitarian
the society is, the more (resp. the less) numerous the lobby of the poor (resp. the rich) is,
and the higher the nal tax rate for both utilitarian and pro-median government. Still the
qualitative results stay the same: in the case of a utilitarian government, lobbying favors
the poor while in the case of a pro-median government lobbying favors the rich.
Now turn to the assumptions of the model. I assume that individualsutility is qua-
silinear in income. I want to concentrate on relative rather than absolute magnitudes of
lobbying formation, so this assumption allows to isolate the e¤ects of interest (for example,
how lobbying formation depends on the shape of income distribution). Would my results
change with concave utility function? The answer to this question is not obvious. In this
case the rich would value each additional unit of income less than the poor so one expects
that the rich will contribute more than the poor. However, in the case where the govern-
ment is utilitarian, it cares about the social welfare of all the individuals, and the poor
would value a slight increase in taxes much more than the rich would value a slight (same)
decrease in taxes, so it would be much cheaper for the poor to buy inuence than for the
rich. What e¤ect would dominate depends on the particular utility function. Still, I expect
that my results will prevail for utility functions that are not too concave in income.
Summing up, I make the following contributions. First, I introduce a new condition for
lobbying formation equilibrium, namely, sincere lobbying formation that reads: an equilib-
rium occurs if no lobby member would prefer her lobby to cease to exist. Second, I show
that the institute of lobbying can favor the poor if o¢ ce-holders do not care about their
reelection prospects and do care about the citizenswelfare (the case of a utilitarian gov-
ernment). However, if the elections are coming and policymakers want to be reelected for
the next term, the wealthy citizens get more political power and the nal policy outcome
favors the rich (the case of a pro-median government). Finally, I nd that political compe-
tition can result in socially optimal outcome. It happens if o¢ ce-holders care only about
contribution payments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 lays out a simple model of public
goods provision. Section 2.3 describes the common-agency model of lobbying. Section 2.4
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develops the sincere lobbying formation concept. Section 2.5 contains numerical solutions
for lognormal distribution of gross income. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 A Simple Model of Public Goods Provision
Consider a society inhabited by a large number (formally a continuum) of individuals, where
I normalize the size (mass) of the population to unity. Individuals di¤er in their income
x. I assume that x is distributed in the population according to a smooth, at least twice
di¤erentiable cumulative distribution function F () with mean bx and support [0;1). The
corresponding density function is denoted by f (). Assume further that x is skewed to the
right, in accordance with evidence from virtually every country.
Each individual with income x has the same quasi-linear preferences over private con-
sumption c (x) and publicly provided goods g, which is given by
u (c; g) = c+
p
g:
One can interpret g in di¤erent ways, as publicly provided private goods, or traditional
public goods. Let g measure spending per capita. Government spending is nanced by
taxing the income of every individual at a common rate t 2 [0; 1]. Then consumption di¤ers
according to
c (x) = (1  t)x;
and the government budget constraint is then simply
tbx = g:
Then the tax preferences of individual x read
u (x; t) = (1  t)x+
p
tbx;
that are concave in tax, implying that every individual x has a uniquely preferred tax rate
tx:
tx =
8><>: 1 if x 2
h
0; 12
pbxi
bx
4x2
if x 2

1
2
pbx;1 :
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Richer individuals want a smaller government because, with taxes proportional to income,
they pay a larger share of the tax burden.2
Let us formulate a normative benchmark. As a basis for this benchmark, consider a
utilitarian social welfare function that simply integrates over the welfare of all individuals:
Uo (t) =
Z 1
0
u (x; t) f (x) dx = (1  t) bx+ptbx;
where the last term is just the utility of the individual with mean income. Then the socially
optimal tax rate coincides with the tax desired by the mean individual to = 14bx .
Alternatively, the median voter preferences can be considered as a benchmark:
Um (t) = (1  t)xm +
p
tbx;
where xm stands for the median voter income and F (xm) = 12 . Then the median voter
preferred tax rate reads tm = bx
4x2m
(that is assumed to be less than 1).
In what follows I work with these two alternative benchmarks.
2.3 Lobby Groups
I focus on lobbying activities in the context of the common-agency model of Bernheim
and Whinston (1986) adapted to lobbying by Grossman and Helpman (1994). In this
approach, lobbying is modeled as "menu auction" where lobbies confront a government
with contribution schedules that map any possible policy into a contribution payment.
Several authors have applied the common-agency model of lobbying to study trade policy,
commodity taxation, provision of local public goods and other policies (see Dixit et al.
1997, Grossman and Helpman 1996, Helpman and Persson 2001, Persson 1998). I use this
approach as well.
I assume that just two lobbies can be formed: a lobby of low-income individuals (the
poor) given by set P , and a lobby of high-income individuals (the rich) given by set R.
Denote by L the set of organized lobbies. In this section I leave aside lobbying formation
considerations and assume that each individual can join one lobby using a decision rule to
2 I assume that individualsutility is quasilinear in income to isolate the e¤ects of income inequality on
lobbying formation.
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be specied below. Suppose further that the lobbies care about the sum of their members
welfare. Thus, the gross objective function of each lobby l 2 L is given by:
U l (t) =
Z
x2l
u (x; t) f (x) dx.
At the rst stage of the game each lobby l 2 L, non-cooperatively and simultaneously,
presents its common agent, the government, with a contribution schedule C l (t) giving a
binding promise of payment conditional on the chosen tax rate. Following the literature, I
concentrate on (globally) truthful contribution schedules that satisfy:
C l (t) = max
h
U l (t)  bl; 0
i
;
where bl is a constant chosen optimally by lobby l. The objective of lobby l is to maximize
the net welfare of its members, namely U l (t)  C l (t).
At the second stage, the government sets t to maximize a weighted sum of its utility
and contributions:
U (t) +
X
l2L
C l (t) ;   0: (3)
An equilibrium of the game is a Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the contribution
schedules and the chosen tax rate.
I analyze two alternative scenarios, namely an utilitarian government, U (t) = Uo (t),
and a pro-median government, U (t) = Um (t). In the former case, the government cares
about the individualswelfare and about contribution payments. In the latter case, the
government is concerned both about total amount of contributions and about its chances
of being reelected. In political economy literature the government concerned about its
reelection prospects maximizes the probability of winning the election. However, in this
framework the election itself is not modeled, so it is more convenient if the governments
objective function gives greater weight to individuals that are believed to determine the
election outcome. Then the closer the governments objective is to the median-voter pre-
ferred policy, the higher the probability to win the election. Alternatively, one can think of
the situation where o¢ ce-holders are "citizen-candidates" (as in Besley and Coate 1997 or
Osborne and Slivinski 1996) who share the preferences of either an individual with mean
income or the median voter.
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To derive an equilibrium in truthful strategies, I use the fact that equilibrium tax rate
is Pareto optimal in the bilateral relation between the government and each lobby.3 There-
fore, the equilibrium tax rate t maximizes the sum of the organized lobbiesnet welfareP
l2L
 
U l (t)  C l (t) and the government objective (3). Then the optimal tax rate maxi-
mizes:
U (t) +
X
l2L
U l (t) : (4)
The rst-order condition of (4) yields the equilibrium tax rate t:
t = arg max
t2[0;1]
 
U (t) +
X
l2L
U l (t)
!
:
To nd the contribution levels in the equilibrium, dene by t l the tax rate that would
emerge if the contribution o¤ered by lobby l were zero, so
t l = arg max
t2[0;1]
0BB@U (t) +X
i2L
i6=l
Ci (t)
1CCA .
In other words, t l is the tax rate that would emerge if lobby l were not formed.
Lobby l will raise its bl to the point where the government is just indi¤erent between
choosing the tax rate t l and choosing the equilibrium tax rate t, that is
U

t l

+
X
i2L
i6=l
Ci

t l

= U (t) +
X
i2L
Ci (t) for all l 2 L:
These two sets of equations allow us to solve for the lobbiescontributions in the equilibrium:
CP = 
 
U
 
t P
  U (t)+ UR  t P   UR (t) (5)
CR = 
 
U
 
t R
  U (t)+ UP  t R  UP (t) :
In the case where there is just one organized lobby, the government derives exactly the
same utility as it would have achieved without any contribution. Thus, a lobby that faces
no competition captures the entire surplus from lobbying activities. If all individuals par-
ticipate in lobbying, the government captures the entire surplus from lobbying activities
and each lobby pays according to the political strength of its rival.
3See Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and Dixit et al. (1997) for the proof.
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So far my analysis leaves aside the crucial issue of lobbying formation. I study this
question in the following section.
2.4 Sincere Lobbying Formation
I assume that lobby Ps goal is to defend special interests of the poor while lobby R aims
to defend special interests of the rich. In my simple model the special interests vary with
preferences over tax rate, that is, in general the poor prefer bigger government and, thus, a
higher tax rate, while the rich want smaller government and a lower tax rate. To reect this
conceptual di¤erence between the two lobbies, I assume that in equilibrium lobby P and
lobby R make contributions to the government in order to raise and to drop, respectively,
the nal tax rate, that is, t P  t  t R.
In this game the choice of each individual is either to be a member of one of two lobbies,
P or R, or not to participate in lobbying activities at all. I assume that each individual
can belong just to one lobby group since in my model lobbies represent opposite interests.
There is no xed cost of forming lobbies. If an individual belongs to a lobby, her welfare
is taken into account when the lobby develops a contribution schedule, but she should bear
a contribution burden which is the same for all the lobby members.4 How do individuals
manage to solve the coordination problem while making their choice? I assume that the
coordination has a simple form that I call sincere lobbying formation.5
Sincere Lobbying Formation Condition: An equilibrium occurs only if no lobby member
would prefer her lobby to cease to exist.
It is evident that the condition should hold in equilibrium: if a lobby member would like
her lobby to cease to exist, then she is "lobbying" in the "wrong" way given her expectations
4 In this quasilinear model it is reasonable to assume that contributions should be proportional to a
marginal utility of income that is the same for all individuals.
5Alternatively, one can think of a society inhabited by individuals of two types with the size of each group
normalized to unity. The rst type individuals are free-riders: they never participate in lobbying activities.
The second type individuals are faithful to their special interest group: they join a lobby if the gain they
get from lobbying activities exceeds the contribution fee. The analysis stays the same for this alternative
interpretation of the model.
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and preferences. Formally, the sincere lobbying formation condition reads:
if x belongs to lobby P , then u (x; t)  C
PR
z2P f (z) dz
> u
 
x; t P

if x belongs to lobby R, then u (x; t)  C
RR
z2R f (z) dz
> u
 
x; t R

:
Term indi¤erent individuals as sincere indi¤erent poor, , and sincere indi¤erent rich, ,
such that
u (; t)  C
PR
z2P f (z) dz
= u
 
; t P

(6)
u (; t)  C
RR
z2R f (z) dz
= u
 
; t R

:
Given this equilibrium concept there can be multiple equilibria. In what follows I consider
the largest possible lobbies, that is, if there are more than one  and more than one  satis-
fying conditions (6), then I call sincere indi¤erent poor the highest  and sincere indi¤erent
rich the lowest .
Then I establish:
Lemma 7 If in equilibrium there exist lobby P and lobby R then P = fxjx 2 [0; )g and
R = fxjx 2 (;1)g.
The formal proof can be found in the Appendix.
Solve the game backwards. Suppose that in equilibrium there exist lobby P = fxjx 2 [0; )g
and lobby R = fxjx 2 (;1)g. To reect the fact that in equilibrium each individual can
belong either to one lobby or to no lobby I assume that   . The nal goal is to nd
these  and .
Now I introduce new pieces of notation. I denote by sl () the size of lobby l. Then
sP ()  F () and sR ()  1   F (). The aggregate income in lobby P (resp. R) is
WP ()  R 0 xf (x) dx (resp. WR ()  R1 xf (x) dx).
The lobbies gross objective functions read:
UP (t; ) =
Z 
0
u (x; t) f (x) dx = (1  t)WP () +
p
tbxsP ()
UR (t; ) =
Z 1

u (x; t) f (x) dx = (1  t)WR () +
p
tbxsR () :
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Then the lobbies develop truthful contribution schedules to o¤er to the government that
chooses a nal tax rate t:
t (; )  arg max
t2[0;1]
 
U (t) + UP (t; ) + UR (t; )

=
bx
4

+ sP () + sR ()
+WP () +WR ()
2
(7)
where
 =
8><>: bx if U (t) = U
o (t)
xm if U (t) = Um (t) :
If lobby l (l = P;R) were not around the tax rate t l () would emerge:
t P ()  arg max
t2[0;1]
 
U (t) + UR (t; )

= t (0; ) =
bx
4

+ sR ()
+WR ()
2
(8)
t R ()  arg max
t2[0;1]
 
U (t) + UP (t; )

= t (;1) = bx
4

+ sP ()
+WP ()
2
: (9)
Denote by  the tax rate that would emerge if there were no lobbies formed. It depends on
the government type ( = to or  = tm) and reads  = bx
42
.
In the case of the utilitarian government, U (t) = Uo (t), the equilibrium tax rate can
be e¢ cient: tj=bx = to. This happens when all individuals participate in lobbying. In this
case lobbies "neutralize" one another, so that Rs bids for a smaller government are matched
in the equilibrium by Ps bids for a bigger government, and political competition results
in socially optimal outcome. Nonetheless, each lobby must make a positive contribution in
order to induce the government to choose this outcome rather than one that would be still
worse from its perspective. If just one lobby were organized, the equilibrium tax rate would
di¤er from the social optimum in favor of the organized group.
In general, the following inequalities hold:
t P () < t (; ) < t R ()
t P () <  < t R () ,
while the relationship between t (; ) and  is as follows:
t (; ) T  i¤  T W
P () +WR ()
sP () + sR ()
: (10)
Condition (10) reads: Lobbying favors the poor (resp. the rich), in other words, the nal
tax rate is higher (resp. lower) than the tax rate that would emerge if there were no lobbies
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formed, if and only if the mean income in the society (in the case of utilitarian government)
or the median-voter income (in the case of pro-median government) is higher (resp. lower)
than the mean income in both lobbies. Lobbying does not a¤ect the nal tax rate if and only
if the mean income in the society (in the case of utilitarian government) or the median-voter
income (in the case of pro-median government) is equal to the mean income in both lobbies.
Thus, the nal tax rate goes in favor of a lobby with higher relative political strength.
I use (5) to nd the lobbiescontributions in the equilibrium:
CP (; ) =
bx
4 (+WR ())
  
+ sR ()
  
+WP () +WR ()
   + sP () + sR ()  +WR ()
+WP () +WR ()
!2
CR (; ) =
bx
4 (+WP ())
  
+ sP ()
  
+WP () +WR ()
   + sP () + sR ()  +WP ()
+WP () +WR ()
!2
:
Given the results above I turn now to the lobbying formation stage of the game. For-
mally, for sincere indi¤erent poor  and sincere indi¤erent rich , the following two condi-
tions must hold:
u (; t (; ))  C
P (; )
sP ()
= u
 
; t P ()

u (; t (; ))  C
R (; )
sR ()
= u
 
; t R ()

;
that yield the system of two equations with two unknowns  and :r
t P ()bx +
r
t (; )bx = + sP () + sR ()sP () + +WR ()r
t R ()bx +
r
t (; )bx = + sP () + sR ()sR () + +WP () :
After plugging in the expressions for t (; ) ; t P () ; t R () from (7), (8) and (9) this
system reads:
+ sR ()
+ sP () + sR ()
+WP () +WR ()
+WR ()
=
+WR () + 2WP ()  sP ()
+WR () + sP ()
+ sP ()
+ sP () + sR ()
+WP () +WR ()
+WP ()
=
+WP () + 2WR ()  sR ()
+WP () + sR ()
:
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In general, it is not straightforward to nd an explicit form solution for this system of
two equations with two unknowns. In what follows, I assume the lognormal distribution of
income and solve for  and  numerically.
2.5 Numerical Solution: Lognormal Distribution of Income
The lognormal distribution is very popular in modeling applications, when the variable of
interest is skewed to the right. I use this distribution as well. Formally, I assume that x
has a lognormal distribution (that is, lnx  N  ; 2). Then the density function reads
f
 
xj; 2 = 1p
2
1
x
e 
(ln x )2
22 ; 0 < x <1;  1 <  <1;  > 0
with mean
bx = e+22
and variance
V ar = e2(+
2)   e2+2 :
To generate the distribution I use gross income descriptive statistics (in particular, mean
and standard deviation) for the United States from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)
dataset for households.6 In LIS dataset gross income amounts are in national currency units
on the year of survey. Since my primary goal is to see the relative magnitudes of lobbying
formation, I normalize gross income statistics for the ease of presentation (see Table 4 in
the Appendix for the original LIS descriptive statistics, normalized descriptive statistics (bx,
p
V ar, xm),  and  for the normalized descriptive statistics, and socially optimal tax rate
to and median voter preferred tax rate tm).
First, I consider a utilitarian government,  = bx. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 5 in the
Appendix contain numerical results and relative magnitudes of lobbying formation for an
utilitarian government with  = 1 and  = 100. Note that the model predicts that in this
case the nal tax rate, t, favors the lobby of the poor P , that is t > to. Accordingly, the
total contribution of lobby P exceeds the total contribution of lobby R, while per member
contribution is higher in lobby R than in lobby P . If  = 1 the model predicts that around
6Available online at http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc.htm (accessed December 11, 2007).
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Figure 5: Sincere Lobbying Formation for US data: the case of utilitarian government with
 = 1.
half of the population joins the lobby of the poor P . As for the lobby of the rich R, it is
much smaller: just around 14 % of the population. The lobby of the poor P is around 4
times bigger than the lobby of the rich R. As for contribution, the lobby of the poor P
pays in total slightly more than the lobby of the rich R, while per member contribution is
around 3:6 times higher for lobby R members than for lobby P members. Figure 5 pictures
lobbying formation for US data in the case of utilitarian government with  = 1.
When  = 100, the government cares much more about social welfare than about
contribution payments, so it is not easy for lobbies to buy inuence. As a result, lobbies
are smaller in size and contribute much less than in the case of  = 1. The equilibrium
tax rate is just slightly higher than the social optimal one and lobby P in total contributes
twice as much as lobby R.
The literature claims that the institute of lobbying does favor richer strata of the society
(see Domho¤ 1983 and Mills 1956). However, my results indicate that it is not necessarily
the case for the utilitarian government. My model of sincere lobbying formation predicts
that lobbying favors poorer individuals, that is, the nal outcome of lobbying formation is
in favor of the lobby of the poor in comparison with the socially optimal one. Moreover, the
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Figure 6: Sincere Lobbying Formation for US data: the case of pro-median government
with  = 1.
lobby of the poor is considerably bigger and contributes more than the lobby of the rich,
while per member contribution is higher in the lobby of the rich.
Now consider a pro-median government,  = xm. Columns 3 and 4 in Table 5 in the
Appendix present the results for a pro-median government with  = 1 and  = 100. The
results indicate that in this case lobbying does favor richer individuals, t < tm. Lobby P is
smaller in size and lobby R is bigger in size than in the case of the utilitarian government
for corresponding values of . Total contributions and per member contribution are higher
in lobby R than in lobby P . If  = 1 lobby P is twice bigger than lobby R. However, the
lobby of the rich contributes around 3:5 times more in total and around 7:8 times more per
member, than the lobby of the poor. Figure 6 pictures lobbying formation for the case of
pro-median government with  = 1 for US data.
When  = 100, it is very di¢ cult for lobbies to buy inuence. Therefore, the lobbies are
smaller in size and pay lower contributions than in the case of the pro-median government
with  = 1. Still, lobbying favors richer individuals since the equilibrium tax rate is slightly
lower than the one preferred by the median voter, and the lobby of the rich pays 4:3 times
higher total contribution than the lobby of the poor.
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The results for the pro-median government are in line with the existing literature: lob-
bying does favor wealthy strata of the society. The nal policy outcome is in favor of the
lobby of the rich (in comparison with the one preferred by the median voter). The lobby
of the poor is more numerous than the lobby of the rich. However, total contributions and
per member contribution are higher in the lobby of the rich.
It is of interest to see the equilibrium evolution for  = 0. Column 5 in Table 5 in
the Appendix contains numerical results and relative magnitudes of lobbying formation for
 = 0. Here the government cares only about contribution payments and individuals know
this. As a result in the equilibrium all individuals participate in lobbying: individuals with
income lower than the mean one belong to the lobby of the poor, and individuals with income
higher than the mean one belong to the lobby of the rich. This happens because individuals
know that the only way to get favorable policy outcome is lobbying: the government does
not care about citizenswellbeing at all. Political competition results in socially optimal
outcome, t = to.7 As I mentioned above, in this case in equilibrium lobbies "neutralize" one
another. Both lobbies pay higher total contributions and higher per member contributions
than in the case of  = 1. However, the lobby of the rich, R, contributes in total more
than the lobby of the poor, P , and lobby P to lobby R size ratio is equal to lobby R to
lobby P total contribution ratio. This is because in equilibrium each lobby pays according
to the political strength of its rival: each lobby must contribute an amount equal to the
di¤erence between what its rival could achieve without competition and what it actually
achieves in equilibrium. Figures 7 and 8 in the Appendix depict the evolution of lobbying
formation equilibrium with the change of   0 for US data. Note that the nal tax rate
under pro-median government is higher than the one under utilitarian government with
lobbying or without it. Therefore, the poor would prefer the pro-median government to the
utilitarian one in spite of the fact that under the latter they could inuence nal policy
in their favor by lobbying. In their turn, the rich would prefer the utilitarian government
to the pro-median one, even when they could lobby more successfully under a pro-median
7The result that policy outcome is socially optimal when all individuals participate in lobbying is due to
Grossman and Helpman (1994). My contribution here is to specify that this happens under a "corrupted"
government that cares only about lobbiesdonations.
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government.
How does the degree of inequality a¤ect sizes of lobbies and policy outcome in the
equilibrium? Figures 9 and 10 in the Appendix represent, respectively, the evolution of
lobbiessizes and tax rate in the equilibrium with the change of standard deviation given
the mean.8 The less egalitarian the society (the higher the standard deviation given the
mean), the more numerous the lobby of the poor is and the less numerous the lobby of
the rich is. This is due to the fact that there are more poor and fewer rich individuals in
less egalitarian societies. As for the equilibrium tax rate, it is increasing in the degree of
inequality both for utilitarian and pro-median governments. This happens just for the same
reason: there are more poor individuals, the lobby of the poor is more numerous so it can
inuence nal policy outcome more successfully. Note that the higher the income inequality
is in the society, the more political inuence the poor have under a utilitarian government.
2.6 Conclusion
The paper studies the impact of lobbying on a public goods provision. I propose a new
equilibrium condition for lobbying formation, namely, sincere lobbying formation: an equi-
librium occurs only if no lobby member would prefer her lobby to stop existing. Lobbying
is modeled as a common-agency problem, only two lobbies can be organized, and there is
no cost of forming lobbies. The model predicts that individuals with more extreme pref-
erences are more likely to participate in lobbying. I solve the model numerically with the
US data from the Luxembourg Income Study to show that lobbying does not necessarily
favor wealthy citizens. The results indicate that if policymakers do not care about their
reelection prospects and do care about the individualswelfare (utilitarian government), the
nal policy outcome favors the poor (in comparison with the socially optimal one). In this
case the lobby of the poor is bigger in size and makes higher total campaign contributions
than the lobby of the rich, while per member contribution is greater in the lobby of the
rich. However, if the elections are close and policymakers want to be reelected (pro-median
8The mean comes from US data: bx = 5:611469.
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government), the nal policy outcome does favor the rich (in comparison with the one pre-
ferred by the median voter), which is in line with the existing literature. In spite of the
fact that the lobby of the poor is more numerous, its total and per member contributions
are lower than ones of the lobby of the rich. However, lobbying does not change nal pol-
icy drastically: with or without lobbying the poor would prefer a pro-median government
to a utilitarian one, while the rich would prefer a utilitarian government to a pro-median
one. In the case where the government cares only about lobbiescontribution payments, all
individuals participate in lobbying: individuals with income lower (resp. higher) than the
mean one belong to the lobby of the poor (resp. the lobby of the rich). In this case political
competition results in socially optimal outcome.
The degree of income inequality in the economy does a¤ect the composition of lobbies
and the nal policy outcome in quantitative terms, namely, the less egalitarian the society,
the more numerous the lobby of the poor, the less numerous the lobby of the rich, and the
higher the nal tax rate both for utilitarian and pro-median governments.
2.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 7. Assume that in equilibrium there exists lobby P . Then
P =
(
x j u (x; t)  C
PR
z2P f (z) dz
> u
 
x; t P
)
:
After straightforward calculations and taking into account that t  t P , the last inequality
reads
x <
pbxp
t +
p
t P
  1
t   t P
CPR
z2P f (z) dz
 :
Thus, in equilibrium lobby P satises P = fx j x 2 [0; )g.
If in equilibrium there exists lobby R, then
R =
(
x j u (x; t)  C
RR
z2R f (z) dz
> u
 
x; t R
)
:
Taking into account that t  t R, the last inequality yields
x >
pbxp
t +
p
t R
  1
t   t R
CRR
z2R f (z) dz
 :
So, in equilibrium lobby R satises R = fx j x 2 (;1)g.
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LIS Mean LIS Std. Dev. bx pV ar xm   to tm
56114.69 56463.514 5.611469 5.6463514 3.95559 1.37513 0.83628 0.0445516 0.0896588
Table 4: The US gross income descriptives from LIS household les (year 2000), normalized
descriptives, corresponding parameters for lognormal distribution, socially optimal tax rate
and median voter preferred tax rate.
utilitarian government pro-median government
 1 100 1 100 0
 4.41232 3.93564 3.75018 2.87648 5.611469
sP 0.551978 0.497587 0.474578 0.351628 0.662078
 9.75917 12.7233 7.63875 10.5252 5.611469
sR 0.140099 0.0812024 0.215658 0.120954 0.337922
t 0.0471963 0.0446328 0.0641447 0.0892857 0.0445516
CP 0.0165386 2.2078410-4 0.0131437 1.3197610-4 0.0396768
CP
sP
0.0299624 4.4370910-4 0.0276956 3.7532910-4 0.0599277
CR 0.0152982 10.643810-5 0.0467925 5.7142910-4 0.0777371
CR
sR
0.109195 13.107710-4 0.216976 4.7243510-3 0.230044
sP
sR
3.93991 6.12774 2.20061 2.90712 1.95926
CP
CR 1.08108 2.0743 - - -
CR
CP - - 3.56007 4.3298 1.95926
CR
sR
CP
sP
3.64442 2.95412 7.83431 12.5872 3.83869
Table 5: Numerical results and relative magnitudes of lobbying formation for utilitarian
and pro-median governments with  = 1,  = 100 and  = 0.
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Figure 7: Sincere indi¤erent poor  and rich  as a function of  for US data: U ; U
(utilitarian government) and M ; M (pro-median government).
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Figure 8: Equilibrium tax rate as a function of  for US data: tU (utilitarian government)
and tM (pro-median government).
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Figure 9: The size of the lobby of the poor sP and the size of the lobby of the rich sR as a
function of standard deviation
p
V ar for constant mean bx = 5:611469 with  = 1: sPU ; sRU
(utilitarian government) and sPM ; s
R
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Figure 10: Equilibrium tax rate as a function of standard deviation
p
V ar for constant meanbx = 5:611469 with  = 1: tU (utilitarian government) and tM (pro-median government).
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CHAPTER III
COMPUTING WELFARE LOSSES FROM DATA UNDER
IMPERFECT COMPETITION WITH HETEROGENEOUS
GOODS
This chapter in based on Corchón and Zudenkova (2009).
3.1 Introduction
One of the most robust ndings of Industrial Organization theory is that market equilibrium
very often yields ine¢ cient allocations. But how large are these ine¢ ciencies? This topic
has inspired a considerable amount of empirical research, from the paper by Harberger
(1954) to the work of Cowling and Mueller (1978), among many others.
In contrast, the theoretical literature is sparse and focuses on the case of homogeneous
products. In that case, when demand and costs are linear and rms are identical, it is
well known that the percentage of welfare losses (PWL) in a Cournot Equilibrium is 1
(1+n)2
where n is the number of rms. McHardy (2000) showed that when demand is quadratic,
welfare losses can be 30% larger than in the linear model. Anderson and Renault (2003)
calculated PWL for a more general class of demand functions. Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005)
showed that if average costs are not increasing and the inverse demand function is concave,
PWL is less than 12n+1 . Finally, Corchón (2008) o¤ered formulae for PWL under free entry
and heterogeneous rms. He showed that PWL can be very large under these conditions.
The only paper dealing with heterogeneous products is by Cable et al. (1994), who studied
a linear duopoly model.
In this paper we analyze PWL in two models of imperfect competition with heteroge-
neous products and a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences: a model with
linear demand functions, as per Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), and a model with
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isoelastic demand functions, as per Spence (1976). In both models, rms produce under
constant average costs.
Our rst step is to nd PWL as a function of the fundamentals, i.e., the parameters of
the demand and cost functions. As these parameters cannot be observed, our second step
is to obtain PWL as a function of observable variables: price, output, number of rms, etc.
Where this is not possible, we introduce items that might be estimated such as elasticity of
demand. The goal of our analysis is to study the impact of observable variables on PWL.1
Even though PWL can be calculated directly from the data on a case-by-case basis, our
approach pinpoints the theoretical factors explaining PWL.
We rst consider the model with linear demand. Assume that rms and demand func-
tions are identical. We show that, given an observation of price, output, marginal cost and
the number of rms, there exist parameters of the demand function that convert this obser-
vation into a Cournot or a Bertrand equilibrium such that PWL is arbitrary (Propositions
14 and 15). This result shows that PWL is unrelated to the di¤erences among prot rates,
contrary to Harbergers dictum: "The di¤erences among these prot rates, as between in-
dustries, give a broad indication of the extent of resource malallocation" (op. cit. p. 79). In
our model all rms have the same rate of return on capital but PWL can be high. It seems
that Harbergers procedure picks up welfare losses stemming from the failure of markets to
equalize prot rates, and not welfare losses from oligopolistic misallocation. The issues are
related, but distinct.
Next we show that if the elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL in a Cournot
equilibrium can be computed from observables (Proposition 16). The elasticity of demand
does not add any new information in the case of a Bertrand equilibrium because it can
be obtained from the markup and the rst-order condition of prot maximization. We
show that if the cross elasticity of demand can be estimated, PWL can be computed from
observations (Proposition 18). Finally, we study how PWL depends on these variables
(Propositions 17 and 19). Some results are as expected, but others are not: PWL is
1This paper does not focus on the maximal PWL. Since product di¤erentiation reduces competition,
PWL in our framework is at least as high as it would be under product homogeneity. See Footnote 7 for the
case of identical rms and formulae (24), and (26) for the case of non-identical rms.
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decreasing on the price-marginal cost margins (often referred to as the "monopoly index",
Lerner, 1934), for example, in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria.2 Another surprising
result is that PWL increases with the elasticity of demand in a Bertrand equilibrium. Why
is this so? Consider two markets, A and B, and let the price-marginal cost margin be larger
in A than in B. This means that the triangle that represents welfare losses is larger in A
than in B. However, the realized welfare is also larger in A than in B because the demand
function in A is above the demand function in B. A priori, there is no good reason to expect
that one e¤ect is larger than the other. In fact, as we noted before, when costs and demand
are linear and rms are identical, these two e¤ects cancel each other out and PWL only
depends on the number of rms.3 The same argument goes for demand elasticity: a larger
demand elasticity means less welfare losses and less realized welfare, so the total e¤ect is
ambiguous.
Next we introduce heterogeneity in demand and costs. We focus on the relationship
between concentration and welfare losses. Some papers have found that the Hirschman-
Herndahl (H) index of concentration is not a good measure of welfare losses. Daughety
(1990) came to this conclusion because more concentration may be associated with a larger
output in a leader-follower equilibrium. In papers by Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Cable et
al. (1994) and Corchón (2008), the same result was related to the fact that the rms could
be of di¤erent sizes.4 This nding contrasts with the 1992 Merger Guidelines issued by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), where H is considered a reasonable measure of welfare
losses (Coate, 2005). We show that when it is optimal to allow all rms to produce, PWL
increases with H in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria (Proposition 22). This case arises
when goods are poor substitutes. We also show that when it is optimal to allow only one
rm to produce, PWL decreases with H. This is what happened in the papers cited above
where products are perfect substitutes.
2This was noted by Formby and Leyson (1982) in the case of monopoly.
3 In other words, price-marginal cost margins do not control for the size of demand. Thus, a high margin
might indicate either that demand is very large and rms are having good timeseven if they are very
competitiveor that rms are "exploiting" consumers and destroying a large part of the surplus. This is true
even if actual production is known, because the price-marginal cost margin is a poor indicator of e¢ cient
production.
4The point that minor rms may be harmful for welfare was rst made by Lahiri and Ono (1988).
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Thus, we nd that concentration is bad (good) for welfare when goods are poor (good)
substitutes. The reason is that e¢ cient production must balance cost savings against con-
sumer satisfaction. The former favors concentrating production in the most e¢ cient rms,
while the latter may require considerable diversication of production. If the last e¤ect is
not very large (i.e., when the products are close substitutes), cost savings drive e¢ ciency
and thus concentration does not harm e¢ ciency. If the products are poor substitutes, how-
ever, e¢ cient production requires output dispersion so concentration is harmful. We also
show that at the value of H proposed by the FTC as a threshold for a concentrated industry,
PWL is large in a Cournot equilibrium but may be small in a Bertrand equilibrium.5
In Section 3.3 we assume that the representative consumer has preferences representable
by a CES utility function. We also assume a large number of identical rms. This model
(Spence, 1976) and its variants (e.g. Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) are popular in the elds of
monopolistic competition, international trade, geography and economics. We depart from
these models, however, by assuming that the number of rms is exogenous. The reason for
this di¤erence is that to endogenize the number of rms we need xed costs, which may
produce large PWL (Corchón, 2008). Since in this paper we want to focus on the PWL
produced by product heterogeneity, we must assume that the number of rms is given. We
show that PWL tends to zero as demand elasticity tends to innity, and that PWL tends to
one as the degree of homogeneity of the CES function tends to one (Proposition 25). This
result qualies a conjecture of Stigler (1949): "...the predictions of this standard model
of imperfect competition di¤er only in unimportant respects from those of the theory of
competition because the underlying conditions will usually be accompanied by very high
demand elasticities for the individual rms". Although a high elasticity of demand makes
PWL small in this model, given any elasticity of demand we can obtain a PWL as close to
one as we wish.
Next, we show that PWL can be recovered from an observation of the price, output,
marginal cost and number of rms (Proposition 26). However, a low price-marginal cost
5Despite the fact that, as shown by Amir and Jin (2001), H is always higher in a Bertrand equilibrium
than in a Cournot equilibrium.
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margin does not guarantee that PWL is small; even if the price tends to the marginal cost,
when the number of rms is su¢ ciently large, PWL may exceed that obtained in a linear
model under monopoly. Moreover, when the number of rms tends to innity, PWL is
decreasing in the price-marginal cost margin (Proposition 27). This is another case where
price-marginal cost margins and welfare losses are not related in the way we had previously
thought.
Summing up, we have three main conclusions. First, our main message is positive:
obtaining PWL from data is possible in two well-known models of imperfect competition.
Second, the roles of rates of returns, markups and the elasticity of demand on PWL are
not always what they have been thought to be. Finally, we explain the role of the H index.
Our formulae unify previous views on the role of elasticities, markups and concentration in
a precise way, with results that may be useful for policy making.
3.2 The Linear Model
In this section we assume that inverse demand is linear and that goods are substitutes.6 In
the rst subsection we assume that all rms are identical, which allows for clean formulae
of welfare losses. In the second subsection we study the case where costs and the intercepts
of inverse demands vary among rms. The resulting formulae for PWL will then be used
to discuss the role of concentration in oligopolistic markets.
3.2.1 The Symmetric Case
The market is composed of n rms. The output and price of rm i are denoted by xi and pi
respectively. The rms are identical, sharing the cost function cxi. There is a representative
consumer with a quadratic utility function
U = 
nX
i=1
xi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj +M;  > c;  >   0;
where M is the consumption of an outside good which is the numeraire. The budget con-
straint is
Pn
i=1 pixi +M = I, where I is a given income. Substituting M into U and elimi-
nating I (which is constant), we obtain U = 
Pn
i=1 xi   2
Pn
i=1 x
2
i   2
Pn
i=1 xi
P
j 6=i xj  
6We study the case of complements in a companion working paper (Corchón and Zudenkova, 2008).
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Pn
i=1 pixi. We call this quantity the consumer surplus. Under our assumptions, this func-
tion is concave. The rst-order condition (FOC) of consumer surplus maximization yields
pi =    xi   
P
j 6=i xj ; i = 1; 2; :::; n. If  = 0 the products are independent, while if
 '  they are almost perfect substitutes.
Denition 8 A linear market is a list f; ; ; c; ng with  > c,  >   0 and n 2 N.
Social welfare is dened as
W = 
nX
i=1
xi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj   c
nX
i=1
xi: (11)
The social optimum is a list of outputs that maximize social welfare. It is easy to see that
the optimal outputs xoi (which are all identical) and the social welfare in the optimum W
o
are
xoi =
  c
 +  (n  1) and W
o =
n (  c)2
2 ( + (n  1) ) :
Now we are ready to dene our equilibrium concepts.
Denition 9 A Cournot equilibrium in a linear market is a list of outputs (xc1; x
c
2; :::; x
c
n)
such that for each i, xci maximizes

  xi   
P
j 6=i x
c
j   c

xi.
From the FOC of prot maximization we nd that
xci =
  c
2 +  (n  1) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (12)
In order to dene a Bertrand equilibrium we write the demand for rm i:
xi =
(   )  pi( + (n  2)) + 
P
j 6=i pj
(   )( + (n  1))  x
b
i(pi; p i), i = 1; 2; :::; n, (13)
where p i is a list of all prices minus pi. Now we can dene a Bertrand equilibrium.
Denition 10 A Bertrand equilibrium in a linear market is a list of prices (pb1; p
b
2; :::; p
b
n)
such that for each i, pbi maximizes (pi   c)xbi(pi; pb i).
From the FOC of prot maximization we obtain
pbi =
(   ) + c( + (n  2))
2 + (n  3) ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (14)
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LetW c be social welfare evaluated at the Cournot equilibrium. Let us dene the percentage
of welfare losses in a Cournot equilibrium as
PWLc  W
o  W c
W o
:
Lemma 11 In linear markets the percentage of welfare losses in Cournot equilibrium is
PWLc =
1
2 + (n  1) 
2
Proofs of this and other results are given in the Appendix.
Notice that PWLc is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation,  . Thus,
the minimal PWLc is 1
(n+1)2
and occurs when  ' , i.e., when the products are perfect
substitutes. The maximal PWLc is equal to 0:25 and occurs for the minimal value of  ,
which is zero when products are independent.
The following Lemma derives PWLb, the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand
equilibrium.
Lemma 12 In linear markets the percentage of welfare losses in Bertrand equilibrium is
PWLb =
 
1  
2 + (n  3) 
!2
: (15)
Note that PWLb is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation  . Thus, min-
imal PWLb is (almost) zero and occurs when  ' , i.e., when the products are perfect
substitutes. Maximal PWLb is equal to 0:25 and occurs for  = 0, when products are
independent. Clearly, if n = 1, PWLj = 0:25, j = c; b, so for the remainder of this section
we will assume that n > 1.
We are interested in the PWL yielded by imperfectly competitive markets, conditional
on certain observable variables: market prices, outputs, marginal cost, and the number of
rms. We assume that the marginal cost is observable because under constant returns, the
marginal cost equals the average variable cost, which in principle can be observed (wages,
raw materials, etc.). Formally:
Denition 13 An observation is a list fp; xi; c; ng where p is the market price, xi is the
output of rm i, c (< p) is the marginal cost and n is the number of rms.
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Let us relate PWL to the observable variables. First consider the Cournot equilibrium.
Proposition 14 Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng and a number v 2 ( 1(n+1)2 ; 0:25] there is
a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (xi; xi; :::; xi) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market,
where p =   xi   (n  1)xi and PWLc = v.
Now we turn to the Bertrand equilibrium.
Proposition 15 Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng and a number v 2 (0; 0:25] there is a
linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market,
xi = x
b
i(p; p i), where p i is a list of n  1 identical p and PWLb = v.
Propositions 14 and 15 show that observable variables put very few restrictions on PWL.
In particular, neither price-marginal cost margins nor prot rates have any relationship
with PWL. Let us look for restrictions that can take a bite out of PWL.7 Suppose that the
demand elasticity, denoted by ", is observable. From (13), we have
"   @xi
@pi
p
xi
=
 + (n  2)
(   )( + (n  1))
p
xi
:
Let us introduce a new piece of notation: T  "p cp . Now we have the following result.
Proposition 16 Given an observation fp; xi; c; n; "g such that T  "p cp  1, there is a
linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (xi; xi; :::; xi) is a Cournot equilibrium for this market,
p =   xi    (n  1) xi and
PWLc =
1 
2 +
(T 1)(n 2)+
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T
!2 (16)
According to Proposition 16 we can calculate PWLc from three variables: the number
of rms, the elasticity of demand and the price-marginal cost ratio. Let us study how
PWLc depends on n and T. Notice that observable variables are not independent and that
in general, a variation in just one observable variable cannot be obtained by a variation
7The maximum PWL in both Cournot and Bertrand equilibria occurs when  ' 0, namely PWL ' 0:25,
which corresponds to PWL under monopoly:
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of a single unobservable variable (see the rst three equations of the proof of Proposition
16). Our exercise just gives us the di¤erence in PWL between two markets in which all
observables except one are identical. Thus, it emphasizes the role played by the observables,
which sometimes contradicts intuition.
Proposition 17 PWLc is decreasing in n, the elasticity of demand, and the price-marginal
costs margins.
In Proposition 17, the signs of the e¤ects of the number of rms and demand elasticity
are just as expected: more competitioni.e., a higher value of n or "is good. However
the e¤ect of price-marginal cost margins runs counter to intuition. As we remarked in the
introduction, this is because the price-marginal cost margin a¤ects both welfare losses and
realized welfare.
Note that we have been applying comparative statics, treating the observable variables
n, " and p cp as exogenous. This approach provides policy-makers with a tool to predict
changes in PWL due to changes in just one of the observables, taking all other variables as
given. If both demand elasticity and the price-marginal cost margin change, one needs to
consider the comparative statics of PWL with respect to the factor T  "p cp given in (31).
We now consider the Bertrand equilibrium. In this case, the FOC of prot maximization
can be written as pi = "(pi c). Thus, an observation of " does not add any new information
once pi and c are observed. A way out of this problem is provided if the cross elasticity of
demand @xi@pj
pj
xi
, denoted by , is observable.
Proposition 18 Given an observation fp; xi; c; n; g such that pp c > (n  1)  0, there is
a linear market f; ; ; c; ng such that (p; p; :::; p) is a Bertrand equilibrium for this market,
xi = x
b
i(p; p i), where p i is a list of n  1 identical p and
PWLb =
 
p
p c   (n  1)
2 pp c   (n  1)
!2
: (17)
The formula (17) allows for the calculation of PWL in a Bertrand equilibrium from just
three magnitudes: the number of rms, the price-marginal cost margins (or alternatively,
64
the elasticity of demand), and the cross elasticity of demand. Let us analyze the impact of
a change in observable variables on PWLb.
Proposition 19 PWLb is decreasing in the number of rms, the price-marginal cost mar-
gins, and the cross elasticity of demand. PWLb is increasing in the elasticity of demand.
Proposition 19 conrms our intuitions about the role of the number of rms and the
cross elasticity of demand on welfare losses, namely that an increase in the number of
rms decreases PWL and an increase in the cross elasticity of demand decreases PWL. The
impacts of the price-marginal cost margin and demand elasticity, on the other hand, are
contrary to intuition. Again, we have to bear in mind that these two variables a¤ect both
welfare losses and realized welfare.
3.2.2 Heterogeneous Firms
We now extend the model presented in Subsection 3.2.1 to the case where rms are het-
erogeneous on two counts. The marginal costs ci may be di¤erent for each rm i. The
parameter , now denoted i, may also vary across rms.8 Assume i > ci for all i: The
consumer surplus is now
U =
nX
i=1
ixi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj  
nX
i=1
pixi;  >   0
The restrictions below guarantee that the outputs of all rms are positive in Cournot and
Bertrand equilibria.
2 +  (n  1) > 
Pn
i=1 (i   ci)
i   ci ; i = 1; 2; :::; n: (18)
( +  (n  1)) (2 +  (n  3))
 +  (n  2) >

Pn
i=1 (i   ci)
i   ci i = 1; 2; :::; n: (19)
Under our assumptions, U() is concave. The FOC of consumer surplus maximization yields
pi = i   xi   
P
j 6=i xj ; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Social welfare is now
W =
nX
i=1
ixi   
2
nX
i=1
x2i  

2
nX
i=1
xi
X
j 6=i
xj  
nX
i=1
cixi: (20)
8This model has been used, among others, by Häckner (2000) and Hsu and Wang (2005).
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Evaluating social welfare in the optimum is not straightforward, because it depends on the
number of active rms in the optimum. For the time being, let us assume that the optimal
number of active rms is m. Then the optimal outputs, denoted by xoi , are equal to
xoi =
i   ci
     

mX
i=1
(i   ci)
( +  (m  1))(   ) ; i = 1; 2; :::;m (21)
and the aggregate output in the optimum, denoted by xo, is equal to
xo =
mX
i=1
xoi =
mX
i=1
(i   ci)
 +  (m  1)
We now nd the optimal number of rms m. Let us rank rms according to the value of
i   ci. Without loss of generality assume that v   cv  v+1   cv+1, v = 1; 2; :::; n   1.
Clearly, if rm v produces a positive output in the optimum, rms v   1; v   2; etc. also
produce positive outputs in the optimum. Suppose that it is optimal for rms 1 through
k   1 to produce positive outputs. By evaluating @W@xk in (20) at xk = 0 and xj = xoj ,
j = 1; :::; k   1 according to (21), we obtain
@W
@xk
= k   ck   
k 1X
j=1
xoj : (22)
If @W@xk  0, clearly, xok = 0. If
@W
@xk
> 0, rm k must produce a positive output in the
optimum.
This algorithm requires knowledge of all the parameters dening a market. In a com-
panion working paper (Corchón and Zudenkova, 2008), we show that all these parameters
can be recovered from market data and demand elasticities by a method identical to that
applied in Propositions 16 and 18. We will focus on two particular cases. First, when
(2   c2)  (1   c1), only rm 1 will produce a positive output in the optimum since
from (21) and (22), @W@x2 = 2   c2    1 c1  0. Second, when
(n   cn)( +  (n  2)) > 
n 1X
i=1
(i   ci) ; (23)
the number of active rms is the same in optimum and in equilibrium, because from (21)
and (22), @W@xn = n   cn   
Pn 1
j=1 x
o
j > 0. Notice that the conditions in (18) and (19) are
implied by (23).
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In this framework, a Cournot equilibrium is a list of outputs (xc1; x
c
2; :::; x
c
n) such that for
each i, xci maximizes

i   xi   
P
j 6=i x
c
j   ci

xi. From the FOC of prot maximization,
we obtain
xci =
i   ci
2     

2   
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
2 +  (n  1) :
And the aggregate output at the Cournot equilibrium is
xc =
nX
i=1
xci =
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
2 +  (n  1) :
In order to compute a Bertrand equilibrium we rst write the demand for rm i:
xi =
i ( +  (n  2))  pi ( +  (n  2))  
P
j 6=i(j   pj)
(   ) ( +  (n  1))  x
b
i (pi; p i) :
A Bertrand equilibrium is a list (pb1; p
b
2; :::; p
b
n) such that for all i p
b
i maximizes (pi   ci)xbi
 
pi; p
b
 i

.
Then we have
xbi =
 +  (n  2)
(   ) (2 +  (2n  3))
 
i   ci     +  (n  2)
(2 +  (n  3)) ( +  (n  1))
nX
i=1
(i   ci)
!
;
and the aggregate output at the Bertrand equilibrium is
xb =
 +  (n  2)
(2 +  (n  3)) ( +  (n  1))
nX
i=1
(i   ci) :
Next, we link PWL to the Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration. Let sji be the
market share of rm i in a Cournot equilibrium (j = c), a Bertrand equilibrium (j = b), or in
the optimum (j = o). We dene the Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration in either
equilibrium as Hj Pni=1(sji )2, j = c; b. In the optimum, we dene it as Ho Pmi=1(soi )2.9
Amir and Jin (2001) show that in our framework Hb > Hc.
Lemma 20 With heterogeneous rms the percentage of welfare losses in Cournot equilib-
rium is
PWLc = 1 
0@ 1 +  (m  1)
m  +

2  
Pm
i=1 s
c
i
1A2 Hc

3  

+ 
Ho

1  

+ 
: (24)
9Notice that in our framework products can be imperfect substitutes, so interpreting
Pn
i=1(si)
2 as the
Hirschman-Herndahl index of concentration may be a bit problematic.
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Note that PWLc here depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation  , the number
of active rms in the optimum m, the sum of the market shares of the m largest rmsPm
i=1 s
c
i , and the Hirschman-Herndahl indices of concentration H
c and Ho evaluated at
the Cournot equilibrium and optimum respectively. When m = 1 we have
PWLc(m = 1) = 1 
Hc

3  

+ 

 +

2  

sc1
2 ;
which is decreasing in Hc. In the other extreme case where m = ni.e., the number of
active rms is the same in the optimum and at a Cournot equilibriumwe prove that
PWLc(m = n) =
Hc

1 + (n  1) 

  
Hc

2  
2 
1 + (n  1) 

+



2 
n  2  (n  1) 
 : (25)
If all rms are identical, Hc = 1n and PWL
c(m = n) = 1
2+(n 1) 

2 , as in Lemma 11.
Notice that Hc and  are less than one, so for reasonable values of n it makes sense to
evaluate (25) as if n were a large number. In this case (25) simplies to
PWLc(m = n; n large) =
Hc
Hc

2  
2
+ 

1  
 , and
@PWLc(m = n; n large)
@ 
=  
Hc

1  2    2Hc(2   )


Hc

2  
2
+ 

1  
2 :
The latter is negative for  2 (0; 1 4H
c
2(1 Hc)) and positive for

 2 ( 1 4H
c
2(1 Hc) ; 1). Thus, the
minimum occurs at  =
1 4Hc
2(1 Hc) : When H
c = 0:18, which the FTC considers the threshold
for a concentrated industry, the minimal PWLc is 0.241967. This value is a large lower
bound.
Now we consider welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
Lemma 21 In a Bertrand equilibrium with heterogeneous rms
PWLb = 1 
 
1+ 

(n 2)

1+ 

(m 1)

m 


1+ 

(n 2)

+

1  


2+ 

(2n 3)
Pm
i=1 s
b
i
!2
 (26)
Hb

1  


3+ 

(3n 4)

+ 


1+ 

(n 2)


Ho

1  


+ 


1+ 

(n 2)

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Thus, PWLb depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation  , the number of active
rms in the optimum m and in a Bertrand equilibrium n, the sum of the market shares of
the m largest rms
Pm
i=1 s
b
i , and the Hirschman-Herndahl indices of concentration H
b and
Ho, evaluated at a Bertrand equilibrium and in the optimum respectively.
As before, let us consider two special cases. First, when in the optimum only rm 1 is
used by the planner. Thus, m = 1 and
PWLb(m = 1) = 1 
 
1+ 

(n 2)



1+ 

(n 2)

+

1  


2+ 

(2n 3)

sb1
!2
Hb

1  


3+ 

(3n 4)

+ 


1+ 

(n 2)

1+ 

(n 2) .
For  ' , this formula reduces to PWLb(m = 1) = 0; as one expects for a Bertrand
equilibrium under product homogeneity. Notice that PWLb(m = 1) is decreasing in Hb.
Second, when the number of active rms is the same in the optimum and in a Bertrand
equilibrium, after lengthy calculations, we obtain the result
PWLb(m = n) =

Hb

1+ 

(n 1)

  


1  


1+ 

(n 1)

Hb

1  


2+ 

(2n 3)
2
+



2
n 2+ 

(3+(n 3)n)
 : (27)
If all rms are identical, Hb = 1n and PWL
b(m = n) =

1  

2+ 

(n 3)
2
as in Lemma 12.
Finally, when n is large, (27) simplies to
PWLb(m = n, n large) =
Hb(1   )

 + 4H
b

1  
 ;
which is decreasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation  . Its maximal value is 0.25
(for  = 0). For H
b = 0:18, PWLb(m = n, n large) =
0:18 0:18 

0:28 

+0:72
which for values of 
larger than 0.75 is less than 4:8%: So in this case a high concentration does not imply large
welfare losses.
From (25) and (27) we obtain the following result:
Proposition 22 PWLj(m = n) is increasing in Hj, j = c; b.
Thus, for m = n PWL increases with H, contrary to what happens when m = 1 in both
Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. This is because the condition m = n (m = 1) is related to
goods being poor (good) substitutes. Finally, a word of caution: in Proposition 22 we have
assumed that H is independent of all other variables a¤ecting PWL, for example  and n.
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But H does depend on these variables. Strictly speaking, Proposition 22 only applies to
variations in H that are caused by variations in the s and cs.
3.3 A Model of a Large Group
In this section we consider the market for a di¤erentiated good supplied by a large number
of rms. Typical examples include restaurants, wine, beer, etc. We will not consider entry
and xed costs, which as shown in Corchón (2008) might produce a very high PWL and bias
our estimates. As the purpose of this paper is to study the impact of product di¤erentiation
alone, we discard these costs. As we will see, even so this model is capable of producing
a very high PWL. The model can be interpreted as a monopolistic competition model in
which the long-run aspects are not considered. In this framework the relative size of rms is
not an important issue, so we will assume that all rms are identical. Also, for convenience,
we will assume that rms compete in quantities.
The consumer surplus is given by
U =
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 
nX
i=1
pixi; ; r 2 (0; 1);
(see Spence, 1976). The inverse demand function of rm i is pi = r
 Pn
i=1 x

i
 r

 1
x 1i .
Denition 23 A CES Market is a list f; r; c; ng with ; r 2 (0; 1), c > 0, and n 2 N.
The prot function for rm i is i = r
 Pn
i=1 x

i
 r

 1
xi   cxi: Because there are many
rms, each rm takes
Pn
i=1 x

i as given. The elasticity of demand, denoted by , is dened
as the inverse of the elasticity of inverse demand:
 =
1
1   : (28)
Thus, as  ! 1 the elasticity of demand becomes innite. Now we have the following
preliminary result.
Lemma 24 In a CES market
PWLs = 1   11 r
1
   r
1  r : (29)
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At rst glance it is surprising that PWLs does not depend on the number of rms n.
However, we did assume that the number of rms is large. Thus, (29) can be understood
as the limit formula when n is large. The following properties of PWLs are easily proven:
Proposition 25 i) PWLs is decreasing in .
ii) lim!1 PWLs = 0 and lim!0 PWLs = 1.
iii) PWLs is increasing in r.
iv) limr!1 PWLs = 1 and limr!0 PWLs = 0.
The explanation of ii) is that when  is close to one (resp. zero), the products are close
to being homogeneous (resp. very di¤erentiated), and welfare losses are small (resp. large);
see formula (28). The explanation of iii) is that as r increases (resp. decreases), the gap
between the optimal and the equilibrium output increases (resp. decreases); see formulae
(33) and (34). It follows from ii) and iv) that it is possible to have a market where the
elasticity of demand is close to innity (i.e.,  is close to 1) and PWL is as close to 1 as we
wish.10 In brief, elasticity of demand is only a partial measure of PWL in this model.
Let us relate PWLs to the observable variables listed in Denition 13 of the previous
section. The FOC of prot maximization imply that  = pp c , so in this framework, as in
the Bertrand case in the previous section, knowledge of the elasticity of demand is of no
help. We will assume that c(ln n+ ln p) < p ln n; this condition ensures that r < 1.
In our construction, the function ProductLog (t) will play a prominent role. This func-
tion, called Lamberts W-function, gives the solution for w in t = wew and has the following
properties:11
i) ProductLog (t) 2 R for t 2  1e ;1;
ii) ProductLog
  1e =  1;
iii) limt!1 ProductLog (t) =1;
iv) ProductLog (0) = 0;
v) ProductLog (t) is increasing in t 2  1e ;1;
vi) eaProductLog(t) (ProductLog (t))a = ta.
10Even if  = r, lim!1 PWLs = 0:2642, a large number.
11See Weisstein (1999).
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Now we arrive at the main result of this section:
Proposition 26 Given an observation fp; xi; c; ng there is a CES market f; r; c; ng such
that (p; xi) is an equilibrium for this market, and
PWLs = 1 

c
p
 1
1 r p
c   r
1  r where r =
ProductLog
 
npxi
 
p
c ln n+ ln xi

p
c ln n+ ln xi
(30)
An important consequence of Proposition 26 is that, given an observation, there is a
unique value of PWLs. In this case, the number of parameters to be "recovered" is equal
to the number of data.
Next, we analyze the properties of PWLs in (30):
Proposition 27 The percentage of welfare losses in the CES model is such that
i) limn!1 PWLs = 1 

c
p
 1
1  cp
 
p
c + 1

.
ii) lim c
p
!1 PWLs = 0.
iii) lim c
p
!1 (limn!1 PWLs) = 1  2e ' 0:2642.
Note that when a nite number of rms are pricing at the marginal cost, PWLs is
close to zero. When an innite number of rms are pricing at the marginal cost, however,
PWLs is quite high. In fact, it could be argued that formula i) above should be used since
we assumed that n was large. In this case, PWLs is decreasing in the price-marginal cost
margin, p cp .
12
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the relationship between observable variables and welfare
losses, taking the behavior of rms as given.13 Our main message is positive in that relating
welfare losses to observables is a feasible endeavor in the models considered in this paper.14
But there is an important caveat: the calculus of welfare losses depends on the forms of
12When n is not large, we have an example, available upon request, showing that PWL is not monotonic
in the price-marginal cost margin.
13See Sutton (1998) for an approach where the only source of variation between rms is the degree of
competitiveness.
14The models presented in this paper have been selected for their impact in the profession. Thus, the
papers by Dixit, Singh and Vives and Spence obtained in the aggregate nearly 1800 citations in Google
Scholar.
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demand and costs not only at the equilibrium point, but at all points in the domain of
these functions. This contrasts with the typical linearization around the equilibrium where
a linear form is supposed to represent the characteristics of a general function around the
equilibrium point. It is clear that welfare losses depend in a fundamental way on the
functional forms, so this issue cannot be dodged. Thus, one can interpret our results by
saying that they show welfare consequences of assumptions that are often made about the
functional forms of demand and costs.
We end this paper by giving some hints as to how data and elasticities may help us to
discriminate among the models. The clearest case is a Bertrand equilibrium. A necessary
condition for this equilibrium to be supported by the data is that for all i, pi = "(pi ci) (ir-
respective of whether the market is linear). If the elasticity of demand cannot be estimated,
Proposition 15 says that any observation can be interpreted as a Bertrand equilibrium.
The case for the CES model relies on two assumptions. On the one hand, the elasticity of
demand must be constant. On the other hand, the cross elasticity of demand (calculated
as 1@pi
@xj
xj
pi
) should be very high (it amounts to nr  ). Finally, let us consider the Cournot
equilibrium. Let     @pi@xi
xi
pi
be the elasticity of the inverse demand function. From the
FOC of prot maximization, we have pi = pi   ci. The elasticity  can be obtained by
inverting the system of demand functions. For instance, in the symmetric case with n = 2,
 = "
"2 2 , which when plugged into the FOC yields
pi ci
pi
= "
"2 2 . If markups, demand
and cross elasticities can be estimated, they must obey the previous equation in a Cournot
equilibrium.
3.5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 11: From (11), social welfare in a Cournot equilibrium can be written
as W c = nxci   2nxc2i   2n (n  1)xc2i   cnxci . Thus, from (12) we obtain
W c =
n (  c)2 (3 + (n  1) )
2 (2 + (n  1) )2 .
Then,
PWLc = 1  W
c
W o
=
1
2 + (n  1) 
2 :
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Proof of Lemma 12: From (14) we nd that all rms produce the same output xbi ,
namely
xbi =
(  c) ( + (n  2) )
(2 + (n  3) ) ( + (n  1) ) :
Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium is W b = nxbi   2nxb2i   2n (n  1)xb2i   cnxbi , or
W b =
n (  c)2 (3 + (n  4) ) ( + (n  2) )
2 (2 + (n  3) )2 ( + (n  1) ) :
Thus,
PWLb = 1  W
b
W o
=
 
1  
2 + (n  3) 
!2
:
Proof of Proposition 14: Let
 = c+
p  cp
v
;  =
p  c
xi
and  =
(p  c)  1  2pv
(n  1) xi
p
v
:
Clearly,  > c and  >   0 since p > c, v > 1
(n+1)2
and v  0:25. We easily see
that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields an equilibrium where xci = xi, i = 1; 2; :::; n,
p =   xi   (n  1)xi and PWLc = v, so the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 15: Let
 = c+
p  cp
v
;  =
p  c
xi
 p
v  1  1 +pv (n  3)
v+ n
 
v pv and  = c  pxi 1  3
p
v+ 2v
v+ n
 
v pv :
It is easy to check that 0 < c <  and  >   0. The linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a
Bertrand equilibrium with pbi = p, x
b
i = xi and PWL
b = v, so the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 16: Let
 = c+
p
2"
 
T (n+ 2)  (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2
!
 =
p  c
xi
 =
(T  1) (n  2) +
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

2T (n  1)
p  c
xi
:
Clearly,  > 0. We need to show that 0   < 1 and  > c. For T  1 the square root
is dened in real numbers and
r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

 (T  1) (n  2) because if not,
n2T < (n  2)2T, which is impossible. Then the condition 0   < 1 amounts to
0  (T 1)(n 2)+
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2T(n 1) < 1 =) 4T (n  1)2 > 0;
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which always holds for T 2 [1;1). The condition  > c amounts to (T  1) (n   2) +r
(T  1)

n2T  (n  2)2

+ 4T > 0, which holds for T 2 [1;1). It is straightforward
to show that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a Cournot equilibrium where xci = xi,
p =   xi    (n  1) xi, and PWLc as dened by (16).
Proof of Proposition 17: From (16) we nd
@PWLc
@n
=  
8T2
 
T 1+ (2+n(T 1))(T 1)p
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
!

2+n(T 1)+2T+
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
3 < 0:
Next we compute
@




@T :
@




@T
=
n(4+n(T 1) 2T) 2(2 T)+(n 2)
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
2(n 1)T2
q
(T 1)(n2T (n 2)2)
(31)
This derivative is positive, so PWLc decreases with T.
Proof of Proposition 18: Let
 = p+
p
p
p c    (n  1)
 =
p

p
p c    (n  2)

xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)

 =
p
xi

p
p c + 

p
p c    (n  1)

It is straightforward to prove that  > c and  > 0; and that  >   0 for pp c > (n 1) 
0. One can easily show that the linear market f; ; ; c; ng yields a Bertrand equilibrium
where pbi = p and x
b
i(p; p i) = xi, and nd PWL
b by plugging the values of  and  in
(15).
Proof of Proposition 19: In a Bertrand equilibrium pp c = ". From (17), we therefore
obtain
@PWLb
@n
=  2" ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 < 0;
@PWLb
@"
=
2 (n  1)  ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 > 0;
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@PWLb
@
=  2 (n  1) " ("  (n  1))
(2"  (n  1))3 < 0:
From these formulae the proposition follows.
Proof of Lemma 20: Social welfare in a Cournot equilibrium, denoted byW c, is given
by
W c =
nX
i=1
(i   ci)xci  

2
nX
i=1
xc2i  

2
nX
i=1
xci
X
j 6=i
xcj =
3   
2
Hcxc2 +

2
xc2
Using the denition of Ho, social welfare in the optimum is
W o =
   
2
Hoxo2 +

2
xo2:
Plugging the values of W c and W o into PWLc yields
PWLc = 1  W
c
W o
= 1 

xc
xo
2 Hc (3   ) + 
Ho (   ) +  ;
while plugging in the values of xc and xo yields formula (24).
Proof of Lemma 21: Social welfare in a Bertrand equilibrium, denoted by W b, is
given by
W b =
(   ) (3 +  (3n  4))
2 ( +  (n  2)) H
bxb2 +

2
xb2 :
Let PWLb be the percentage of welfare losses in a Bertrand equilibrium.
PWLb = 1  W
b
W o
= 1 

xb
xo
2
Hb (   ) (3 +  (3n  4)) +  ( +  (n  2))
(Ho (   ) + ) ( +  (n  2))
Plugging in the values of xb and xo; we obtain the formula above.
Proof of Proposition 22: Computing @PWL
c
@Hc (m = n), we obtain



1  


1+ 

(n 1)

4+ 

(n 2)


4Hc

1+ 

(n 2)

+



3
(Hc 1)(n 1)+



2
(n 2+Hc(5 4n))
2 ;
which is positive for  > 0. Also,
@PWLb
@Hb
(m = n) is equal to



1  


1+ 

(n 1)

1+ 

(n 2)

4+5 

(n 2)+



2
(6+(n 6)n)


4Hb

1+2 

(n 2)

+



3
(3 Hb(3 2n)2+(n 3)n)+



2
(n 2+Hb(21+4(n 5)n))
2 ;
which is positive for  > 0.
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Proof of Lemma 24: The FOC of prot maximization for rm i is
r
 
nX
i=1
xi
! r

 1
x 1i   c = 0: (32)
The left-hand side of (32) is decreasing in xi, so the second-order condition holds. In a
symmetric equilibrium where all rms produce the same output, denoted by xi , we have
xi =

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
, p =
c

and U = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
: (33)
In this equilibrium, the social welfare is
W  = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
  nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
:
In the optimum the price equals the marginal cost. Thus, r
 Pn
i=1 x

i
 r

 1
x 1i = c. From
this we get
xoi =

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
and W o = n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r
  nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
; (34)
where xoi and W
o stand for the output and social welfare in the optimum. W o is increasing
in n, so in the full optimum the planner would choose a number of rms equal to n.
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses is:
PWLs = 1  W

W o
= 1 
n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r   nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
n
r


r
cn1 
r

 r
1 r   nc

r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
= 1   11 r
1
   r
1  r :
Proof of Proposition 26: Let  and r be such that
r
cn1 
r

 1
1 r
= xi and
c

= p
The previous equations yield
 =
c
p
and r =
ProductLog
 
npxi
 
p
c ln n+ ln xi

p
c ln n+ ln xi
It is straightforward to check that 0 <  < 1 and 0 < r < 1 (using the condition cp <
ln n
ln n+ln p). Then by construction the CES market f; r; c; ng yields an equilibrium where
p = p and xi = xi. Plugging  and r into (29), we get the formula for PWL
s as a function
of an observation fp; xi; c; ng.
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CHAPTER IV
WELFARE LOSSES IN MODELS OF HORIZONTAL AND
VERTICAL DIFFERENTIATION
4.1 Introduction
One of the main issues in the theory of Industrial Organization is the ine¢ ciencies yielded by
the decentralized nature of equilibrium. In a pathbreaking contribution, Harberger (1954)
provided a quantitative estimate of these ine¢ ciencies. His paper, no matter how debatable,
has generated an enormous amount of literature trying to prove or disprove his main nd-
ings. Unfortunately, much of this literature did not pay attention to the subtleties implied
by the theory of Industrial Organization. Recently, theoretical background to approach this
problem has been provided by Cable et al. (1994), McHardy (2000), Anderson and Renault
(2003), Johari and Tsitsiklis (2005), Corchón (2008) and Corchón and Zudenkova (2009).
Another strand of literature is Algorithmic Game Theory. This is a new scientic
branch arising from the conuence of Computer Science, with its emphasis on computing
algorithms, and Game Theory with its emphasis on rational players. For a good introduction
see Nisan et al. (2007). The theory has several goals. Of particular interest to us is the goal
of quantifying the extent of ine¢ ciencies yielded by the non-cooperative equilibrium.1 This
is done by considering the ratio between the values of the objective function representing
social values in the equilibrium and in the optimum.2
Our paper aims to contribute to the convergence of these two strands of literature by
studying the percentage of welfare losses in models of horizontal (Hotelling 1929amended
by dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, and Economides 1984and Salop 1979) and
vertical di¤erentiation (Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979, 1980, and Shaked and Sutton 1982,
1Other goals are to explain how equilibrium is reached and the design of resource allocation mechanisms
with good properties, with special attention to computational problems. See Nisan et al. (2007).
2The measure considered by Harberger (H) and that used in algorithmic game theory (A) are related as
follows: H = 1 A.
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1983). In all these models rms act strategically. The motivation for our study is that
these models are very di¤erent from those in which welfare losses have been investigated.
In the models considered here, there is a continuum of consumers (and not a representative
consumer) and each consumer consumes, at most, one unit of the di¤erentiated good (and
not many units). Also, in the models of Hotelling and Shaked and Sutton rms are free
to locate in the product space. In both respects these models are closer to the model of
a communication network by Acemoglu, Bimpikisb and Ozdaglar (2009).3 As we will see,
these di¤erences make the analysis of welfare losses here very di¤erent from those analyzed
before.
Section 4.2 considers the Hotelling model. Like Harberger (1954), we consider the
percentage of welfare losses (PWL) dened as the percentage at which equilibrium welfare
falls short of the optimum. We rst study how PWL depends on the basic parameters that
dene the market such as the reservation price (), transportation cost () and marginal
costs (c). We nd that PWL depends on  c but not in a monotonic way. The reason
is that a change in  c not only changes welfare for given locations but it causes rms
to reallocate. Next, we study if PWL can be recovered from observable variables such as
prices, marginal costs, the distance between brands and the percentage of market coverage.
We nd that, in most cases, PWL can be calculated from location and market coverage
alone. PWL decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market
should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the distance from the
market edges as it goes to the optimal location. Prices, marginal costs (and thus markups)
and demand elasticities do not help to nd PWL: Finally, PWL might be large despite
price competition. This shows that misallocation arising from the wrong location could be
very signicant, especially when not all the market is covered.
Section 4.3 considers a model of a circular city (Salop 1979). Here PWL depends on
 c
 but also on the number of rms (n) and the form of the transportation cost () which
in Hotelling was quadratic ( = 2) and here is either linear ( = 1) or quadratic ( = 2). As
3But the models considered here and that of Acemoglu, Bimpikisb and Ozdaglar are di¤erent too. For
instance, in the latter, equilibrium is not necessarily unique.
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in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with the market coverage, unless in the optimum
the whole market should not be covered, in which case PWL is constant. Here, PWL
can be calculated in all cases. In other words, the indeterminacy that occurred in the
Hotelling model does not arise here. As in the Hotelling model and for the same reason,
PWL is independent of demand elasticities and markups. Also, since here there are no
misallocations due to rms being in the wrong locations, PWL tends to be smaller than
in the Hotelling model. But these losses may be large, up to 25%. Finally, PWL is not
monotonic in  for given market coverage. The reason is that a change in  changes welfare
both in equilibrium and in the optimal allocations.
In Section 4.4 we study oligopolistic competition under quality di¤erentiation, see Gab-
szewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). We assume that the
parameter that measures the taste for quality is uniformly distributed across the population
of consumers, with extrema a and b. Here we have two kinds of equilibria: those in which
the whole market is covered and those in which not all the market is covered. We nd
that PWL is a discontinuous function of ba alone with a maximum of about 8:33%. The
discontinuity is caused by the fact that when ba = 8, rm 1 freezes the quality of its good
and does not serve consumers with low taste for quality. Thus the discontinuity arises at
the point in which the market becomes uncovered.
We show that under quality di¤erentiation welfare losses can be found from the relative
prices and the degree of market coverage. When the whole market is covered, PWL is
single-peaked in relative prices reaching a maximum at an interior point. Thus an increase
in relative prices can decrease or increase relative welfare losses. When not all the market
is covered, PWL depends only on market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected.
Section 4.5 sums up our ndings.
4.2 Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Hotelling Model
There are two rms producing a di¤erentiated good. Consumers purchase either one unit
or none of the di¤erentiated good according to preferences, prices and the distribution of
the two brands in product space. Brands are located in the interval [0; 1]. Each consumer
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has a most-preferred brand specication  . Consumers are uniformly distributed along [0; 1]
with density 1. A brand located at point xi, i = 1; 2, is valued for the consumer at point 
according to U (xi; ) =  d where  stands for the reservation price, d = jxi    j is the
Euclidean distance between xi and  ,  and  measure the importance of transportation
costs, and  and  are positive. The decision rule of consumer  is: purchase one unit of
brand xi if maxi [U (xi; )  pi]  0, where pi is the price of the brand xi, i = 1; 2. The
marginal cost of production is c < .
The model where  = 1 is not easily tractable since prot functions are discontinuous
and nonconcave.4 To overcome these di¢ culties we assume that  = 2. Summing up:
Denition 28 A Linear Horizontal Market is a list of positive real numbers f; ; cg with
 > c.5
Let us consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, rms choose their locations x1 and
x2 simultaneously. In the second stage, they choose prices simultaneously. Without loss of
generality, assume that x2  x1. Firm is prot is i = (pi   c)Di where Di is the demand
of rm i. It is easy to show that prot functions are continuous and concave and a Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium exists.6
We consider three symmetric equilibrium congurations: local monopolistic equilib-
rium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.7 We characterize equilibria where
consumers at the edges of the market buy the di¤erentiated good.8
Local monopolistic equilibrium. At this equilibrium, some consumers lying between two
rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated good, so the market is not fully covered. Each
4For further details see dAspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Economides (1984).
5"Linear" relates to the linear form of the product space. "Horizontal" refers to the form of product
di¤erentiation. In Section 4.4 we will speak of a "Linear Vertical" market in which product di¤erentiation
is vertical.
6See Economides (1986) for the general case of   2. Economides (1986) showed existence for  2
(1:26; 2].
7Salop (1979) used the term "kinked" for an equilibrium where the markets just touch and there is no
tangency of demand. Economides (1984) used the term "touching" for such an equilibrium.
8Economides (1984) studied the case of "not-too-high" reservation price where consumers at the edges
of the market prefer not to purchase the di¤erentiated good. He showed that under linear transportation
cost function the equilibrium of the locations game is a local monopolistic one. The reason is that in
the "competitive region" rms have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other and reach the
"kinked" region. While in the "kinked" region rms still want to relocate away from each other and reach
the "local monopolistic" region.
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rm charges monopoly price pm. A consumer with preferred brand  2
 
x1;
1
2

is in-
di¤erent between purchasing from rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good if
    (   x1)2   pm = 0. Thus, rm 1s demand is D1 (pm) =  = x1 +
q
 pm
 . In the
second stage rm 1s prot maximization with respect to pm yields
pm (x1) =
1
9

6+ 3c  2x21 + 2
q
x21
 
3 (  c) + x21

.
Plugging pm (x1) into rm 1s prot yields
1 (x1) = (pm (x1)  c)
 
x1 +
s
  pm (x1)

!
.
After tedious calculations one nds that @1@x1 > 0, so rms have incentives to relocate towards
the market center still maintaining local monopoly power. Firms will move to the market
center until consumers at the edges of the market are just indi¤erent between buying the
di¤erentiated good and not. One can check that in this case the rmsmarginal relocation
tendency becomes zero.
Consumers at the edges of the market are indi¤erent between buying the good and
not buying it, which amounts to x1  
q
 pm(x1)
 = 0. Consumers at the market cen-
ter do not buy the di¤erentiated good, which amounts to x1 +
q
 pm(x1)
 <
1
2 . These
two conditions yield a local monopolistic equilibrium: rm 1 chooses x1 =
q
 c
5 , and by
symmetry rm 2 chooses x2 = 1  
q
 c
5 . Both rms charge the same price p

m =
4+c
5 .
This equilibrium exists for  c <
5
16 . Thus, a Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for a lin-
ear horizontal market f; ; cg with  c < 516 is a price pm = 4+c5 and brand locations
fxm1; xm2g =
nq
 c
5 ; 1 
q
 c
5
o
.
Kinked equilibrium. At a kinked equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with
preferred brand specication  = 12 is indi¤erent between purchasing from rm 1 or from
rm 2 at price pk and not purchasing the di¤erentiated good if    
 
1
2   x1
2   pk = 0.
Thus, pk (x1) =    
 
1
2   x1
2
. At the same time, rms still enjoy local monopolistic
power, therefore pk (x1) = pm (x1), which yields
x1 = 1 
1
2
r
4
  c

+ 1 and pk =
1
2

2c   +
p
 (4 (  c) + )

.
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In the kinked equilibrium rms behave as local monopolists but maintain full market cov-
erage so x1 > 0 or
 c
 <
3
4 . The consumers at the edges of the market purchase the
di¤erentiated good so    (x1)2   pk  0, which simplies to  c  516 .
Note that for 34   c < 54 there is a kinked equilibrium with fx1; x2g = f0; 1g and
pk =    4 , which is an intermediate case between the kinked equilibrium described
above and the competitive equilibrium, which is analyzed below. Therefore, a Kinked
Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with 516   c < 34 is a price pk =
1
2

2c   +p (4 (  c) + ) and brand locations fxk1; xk2g = n1  12q4 c + 1; 12q4 c + 1o.
Moreover, a Kinked Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with 34   c < 54
is a price pk =   4 and brand locations fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g.
Competitive equilibrium. A consumer with preferred brand specication  2 (x1; x2), is
indi¤erent between purchasing brand x1 and purchasing brand x2 if
   (   x1)2   p1 =    (x2   )2   p2 )  = p2   p1
2 (x2   x1) +
x1 + x2
2
;
so the demands D1 (p1; p2) and D2 (p1; p2) faced by rms 1 and 2 read
D1 (p1; p2)   = p2   p1
2 (x2   x1) +
x1 + x2
2
D2 (p1; p2)  1   = 1  p2   p1
2 (x2   x1)  
x1 + x2
2
Firm is prot maximization with respect to pi yields
p1 = c+

3
(x2   x1) (2 + x1 + x2) and p2 = c+ 
3
(x2   x1) (4  x1   x2) ;
and corresponding prots become
1 =

18
(x2   x1) (2 + x1 + x2)2 and 2 = 
18
(x2   x1) (4  x1   x2)2 :
The "marginal relocation tendency of rms" reads @1@x1 < 0 and
@2
@x2
> 0. Thus, the rms
have incentives to relocate marginally away from each other. The equilibrium has two rms
locating at the two extremes of the product space (maximal di¤erentiation) x1 = 0 and
x2 = 1 and charging the same price pc = c + . At the competitive equilibrium the entire
market is covered, so    122 pc  0, which amounts to  c  54 . Finally, a Competitive
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Equilibrium for a linear horizontal market f; ; cg with  c  54 is a price pc = c+  and
a list of brand locations fxc1; xc2g = f0; 1g.
Thus, the equilibrium conguration depends on the values taken by  c .
- For low values of  c (i.e.
 c
 <
5
16), there exists a local monopolistic symmetric
equilibrium where the rms enjoy monopolistic power at the market edges while consumers
in the centre of the market do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity. The higher the
value of  c , the closer rm 1 (resp. rm 2) to location
1
4 (resp.
3
4).
- If  c =
5
16 there exists a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered and
fxk1; xk2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
. In this equilibrium rms enjoy all the monopolistic power: they sell
to consumers both at the market edges and in the market center, and still do not become
involved in the competition between each other.
- If 516 <
 c
 <
3
4 there is a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered, rms
do not compete for the market center consumers (the markets just touch) but do not extract
all the possible surplus from the market edges consumers: the consumer at the edges of the
market get positive surplus by purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity.
- If 34   c < 54 there exists a kinked equilibrium where the whole market is covered,
rms are situated at the edges of the market fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g and do not compete for
the market center consumer (the markets just touch).
- Finally, for high values of  c (i.e.
 c
  54) there is a competitive equilibrium where
the entire market is covered, the rms are situated at the edges of the market fxc1; xc2g =
f0; 1g and compete for the market center consumers.
Dene social welfare W as the gross consumerssurplus minus costs (i.e., the marginal
cost and the consumerstransportation costs):
W = 2
Z
0

  c   (t  x1)2

dt
which is equal in equilibrium to
W  =
8>>>><>>>>:
56
15
p
5
(  c)
q
 c
 if
 c
 <
5
16
3
4
q
4 c + 1  56 if 516   c < 34
  c  12 if  c  34
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Note that the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is just a transfer
from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare is only a¤ected by
the market coverage and rmslocations, which determine the consumerstransportation
costs and the consumerssurplus net of marginal cost. This is the reason why the social
welfare in a kinked equilibrium for 34   c < 54 is the same as the social welfare in a
competitive equilibrium for  c  54 . Indeed, in both cases the whole market is covered
and the rms are located at the market edges.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost and the rmslocations
to maximize the social welfare. One can check that the social welfare in the optimum,
denoted by W o, is equal to
W o =
8><>:
8
3 (  c)
q
 c
 if
 c
 <
1
16
  c  48 if  c  116
where the rst line corresponds to the case where not all the market is covered and con-
sumers at the market center do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity; the second line
corresponds to the case where the entire market is covered and the rms are located at
fxo1; xo2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
The percentage of welfare losses is dened as
PWL  1  W

W o
and is equal to
PWL =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1  7
5
p
5
 0:3739 if  c < 116
1 
56
15
p
5
q
 c

1  1
48

 c
if 116   c < 516
1 
3
4
q
4 c

+1  5
6
 c

  1
48
if 516   c < 34
1 
 c

  1
12
 c

  1
48
if  c  34
(35)
Figure 11 depicts PWL as a function of  c . Note that PWL is not monotonic in
 c
 . The reason is that change in
 c
 not only changes welfare for given locations but it
causes reallocation e¤ects that may overcome the latter e¤ect. For instance, a decrease in
transportation costs  makes the economy more competitive, but at the same time causes
rms to relocate away from each other increasing monopoly power.
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Figure 11: PWL as a function of  c .
- For  c <
1
16 PWL is constant. In this case the market is not covered either in
equilibrium or in the optimum. Welfare losses are due to the rmsmonopolistic behavior.
- For 116   c < 516 , PWL is decreasing in  c . In this case in equilibrium the market
is not covered, while in the optimum it should be covered. Indeed, with increase of  c the
equilibrium conguration becomes closer to the optimum conguration fxo1; xo2g =

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
- For  c =
5
16 PWL = 0 since equilibrium conguration is the same as the optimum
one: the whole market is covered and the rms are located at

1
4 ;
3
4
	
.
- When 516 <
 c
 <
3
4 PWL is increasing in
 c
 . In this case the higher
 c
 is, the closer
the rms locate to the edges of the market (so the higher the consumerstransportation
costs are). This e¤ect exacerbates welfare losses.
- Finally, when  c  34 PWL is decreasing in  c . Here in equilibrium, the rms
locate at the market edges and compete for the consumers located at the market center.
Thus, PWL is decreasing in  c .
So far we have analyzed the relationship between PWL and the parameters dening a
linear horizontal market f; ; cg. Let us now relate PWL with observable variables. An
Observation is a tuple fp; c; x;mg of market price p, marginal cost c (p > c), the relative
distance from the market edges to brand locations x 2 0; 14 and the percentage of market
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coverage m 2 [0; 1]. We assume that the marginal cost is observable because under con-
stant returns, the marginal cost equals the average variable cost, which in principle can be
observed (wages, raw materials, etc.). Then, we have the following:
Proposition 29 Given an observation fp; c; x;mg there is a linear horizontal market f; ; cg
such that fp; x; 1  xg is
i) a local monopolistic equilibrium for this market when m < 1 and 0  x < 14 ;
ii) a kinked equilibrium for this market when m = 1 and 0 < x  14 ;
iii) either a kinked equilibrium or a competitive equilibrium for this market when m = 1
and x = 0;
PWL in each case is given by
PWL =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1  7
5
p
5
 0:3739 if m < 1, 0  x < 1
4
p
5
1  896x3
240x2 1 if m < 1,
1
4
p
5
 x < 14
1  32 72x35 48x(2 x) if m = 1, 0 < x  14
2  0; 335 , 335  0:0857 if m = 1, x = 0
(36)
Proofs of this and other propositions are given in the Appendix.
Figure 12 depicts PWL as a function of observables. In general, as expected, PWL
decreases with market coverage (unless in the optimum the whole market should not be
covered, in which case PWL is constant) and with the distance x from the market edges as
it goes to the optimal location 14 . Other points are worth discussion.
Firstly, PWL can be calculated from location and market coverage in three out of four
cases in (36). Only in the case where the whole market is covered and the rms locate at
the market edges, i.e. m = 1 and x = 0, could PWL be any number between zero and 335 ,
even if price and marginal cost are observed.9 Knowledge of demand elasticity, denoted by
", cannot be used to break the indeterminacy of PWL. In the case of a kinked equilibrium,
the demand function is not di¤erentiable so demand elasticity is not well dened. In the
case of a competitive equilibrium, from the rst order condition of prot maximization
9PWL could be calculated if the reservation price is observed. The latter is usually thought to be private
information but, in some cases, can be elicited by the mechanism of Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964).
For the limitations of this mechanism see Horowitz (2006) and the references there.
87
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
x
PWL
Figure 12: PWL as a function of observable relative distance x from the market edges to
brand locations when the market is not covered, m < 1 (dash), and when the market is
covered, m = 1 (solid).
" = pp c , so knowledge of " is redundant. The same argument applies if the cross elasticity
of demand @Di@pj
pj
Di
, denoted by , is observable since in our model, in equilibrium,  = ".10
Secondly, PWL is independent from demand elasticities (own and cross) and markups.
This is explained by the fact that as demand is totally inelastic, a high price, unless it induces
not to buy the good, does not cause welfare losses. As we remarked before, an increase in
price just redistributes the surplus between consumers and rms. This makes a di¤erence
with models in which consumers may buy several goods where demand elasticities and
markups can be used to nd PWL even though their impact is sometimes counterintuitive.
See Corchón and Zudenkova (2009).
Thirdly, PWL might be large, larger than in the Cournot model with linear demand and
cost functions, which in the duopoly case is around 11% (Anderson and Renault 2003). And
this occurs despite price competition in the Hotelling model. This shows that misallocation
arising from the wrong location could be very signicant, especially when not all the market
10However, if it could be determined if the demand function is di¤erentiable, we would know if the market
is in a kinked equilibriumwhere PWL lies between 3
59
and 3
35
or in a competitive equilibrium where PWL
lies between 0 and 3
59
.
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is covered. See Figure 12.
4.3 Horizontal Di¤erentiation: The Salop Model
Consider the economy described in the previous section with the following changes. Firstly,
the product space of the monopolistically competitive industry is a circle with a perimeter
equal to 1. Secondly, there are n brands of the di¤erentiated good available at prices
p1; :::; pn. As before, each rm is allowed to produce just one brand. Thirdly, rms do not
choose their brand location, but are automatically located equidistant from one another
on the circle.11 This simplication allows this model to be solved for linear ( = 1) and
quadratic ( = 2) transportation costs. Summing up:
Denition 30 A Circular Market is a list f; ; c; n; g, where ; ; c 2 R+,  2 f1; 2g;
n 2 N, and  > c.
Firm is prot is i = (pi   c)Di where Di is the demand rm i faces and pi is the price
chosen by rm i. As before, we consider three symmetric equilibrium congurations: local
monopolistic equilibrium, kinked equilibrium and competitive equilibrium.
Local monopolistic equilibrium. At the local monopolistic equilibrium, some consumers
lying between two neighboring rms do not purchase the di¤erentiated commodity, so the
market is not covered. Each rm charges monopoly price pm. A consumer with preferred
brand specication located at the distance  2  0; 12n from rm is brand specication, is
indi¤erent between purchasing from rm i and not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity
if      pm = 0. Thus, rm is demand is
Di (pm) = 2 = 2

  pm

 1

.
Firm is prot maximization yields pm =
c+
1+ . In local monopolistic equilibrium not
all the market is covered, which amounts to ( c)n

 <
1+
2 . Thus, a Local Monopolistic
Equilibrium for a circular market f; ; c; n; g with ( c)n < 1+2 is a price pm = c+1+
and a quantity Di (pm) = 2

 c
(1+)
 1

, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
11See Economides (1989) where this assumption emerges in equilibrium in a model where rms decide on
locations.
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Kinked equilibrium. At a kinked equilibrium, markets just "touch". A consumer with
preferred brand specication located at the distance  = 12n from a rms brand specica-
tion, is indi¤erent between purchasing from a rm or from its closest neighbor at price pk and
not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity if     12n pk = 0. Thus, pk =     12n .
In kinked equilibrium the entire market is covered, Di = 1n , but there is no tangency of
demand. These conditions amount to 1+2  ( c)n

  12 + 1. Therefore, a Kinked
Equilibrium for a circular market f; ; c; n; g with 1+2  ( c)n

  12 + 1 is a price
pk =   
 
1
2n

and a quantity Di (pk) =
1
n , i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Competitive equilibrium. Firms are located equidistant from one another and compete in
prices given these locations. Since they are located symmetrically, they will charge the same
price pc in the equilibrium. Firm i has two potential competitors, namely rms i   1 and
i+ 1. Suppose that it chooses price pi  p. A consumer with preferred brand specication
located at the distance  2  0; 1n from rm is brand specication, is indi¤erent between
purchasing from rm i and from is closest neighbor if      p =      1n      pc.
Thus, is demand reads
Di (p; pc) = 2 =
1
n
+
pc   p

n 1:
Firm is prot maximization yields (in equilibrium p = pc) pc = c +

n . In competitive
equilibrium all consumers receive positive net surplus so the entire market is covered, which
amounts to ( c)n

 >
1
2 + 1. Finally, a Competitive Equilibrium for a circular market
f; ; c; n; g with ( c)n > 12 + 1 is a price pc = c + n and a quantity Di (pc ; pc) = 1n ,
i = 1; 2; :::; n.
As before, the equilibrium conguration depends on the underlying parameters. When
 c
 and n are small, the market is small (either because the reservation price and/or the
number of rms are small or because marginal costs and/or transportation costs  are large)
and local monopolies arise.12 For intermediate values of ( c)n

 markets touch and a kinked
equilibrium arises. Finally, when ( c)n

 is large enough the economy becomes competitive.
12Notice that  appears in both sides of the inequalities dening di¤erent equilibria and its e¤ect on them
is not straightforward.
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Social welfare, W , dened as before is
W = 2n
Z 
0
(  c  t) dt;
which in the equilibrium reads for  = 1; 2
W  =
8><>:
2(2+)
(1+)
2+ 1
( c)1+
1
 n

1

if ( c)n

 <
1+
2
  c  2(1+)n if ( c)n

  1+2
Notice that, again, the social welfare does not depend on the equilibrium price, which is
just a transfer from the consumers to the producers. In our framework the social welfare
is only a¤ected by the market coverage, which determines the consumerstransportation
costs and the consumerssurplus net of marginal cost.
A social planner would choose the price equal to marginal cost, which a¤ects the market
coverage and, therefore, the consumers transportation costs and the consumers surplus
net of marginal cost. It is straightforward to show that the social welfare in the optimum,
denoted by W o, reads
W o =
8><>:
2
1+
( c)1+
1
 n

1

if ( c)n

 <
1
2
  c  2(1+)n if ( c)n

  12
where the rst (resp. second) line corresponds to the case where not all the market (resp.
the whole market) is covered in the optimum and  = 1; 2. The percentage of welfare losses,
dened as before, equals
PWL =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
1  2+
(1+)
1+ 1
if ( c)n

 <
1
2
1 
2(2+)
(1+)
2+ 1

( c)n

 1

1  1
2 (1+)

( c)n
if 12  ( c)n

 <
1+
2
0 if ( c)n

  1+2
(37)
where  = 1; 2. Notice that the rst two lines (37) refer to local monopolistic equilibrium.
The rst (resp. second) line refers to the case in which the market should not (resp. should)
be covered in the optimum. The last line refers to kinked and competitive equilibria. Since
in the Salop model rms are located optimally and the price just transfers money from
consumers to producers, positive welfare losses are only possible when the market is not
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Figure 13: PWL as a function of ( c)n

 for linear  = 1 (solid) and quadratic  = 2 (dash)
transportation costs.
covered. Figure 13 depicts PWL as a function of ( c)n

 for linear  = 1 (solid) and
quadratic  = 2 (dash) transportation costs.
We now study the relationship between the observable variables and PWL. As before,
we assume that market price, outputs, marginal costs, number of active rms and  can
be observed (in the Hotelling model we assumed that  = 2). Our view is that  reects,
basically, the technology of transportation and that this technology is common knowledge.
Formally, let fp; x; c; n;g be an Observation, where p (> c) stands for market price, x
is quantity sold by each rm, which is dened as a proportion of consumers purchasing
from each rm, c is marginal cost, n 2 N is number of active rms and  2f1; 2g is the
transportation costs. Then, we have the following result.
Proposition 31 Given an observation fp; x; c; n;g there is a Circular Market f; ; c; n;g
such that fp; xg is a Local Monopolistic Equilibrium for this market when not all the market
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Figure 14: PWL as a function of market coverage xn for linear (solid) and quadratic (dash)
transportation costs.
is covered, i.e. when xn < 1, and PWL is given by
PWL =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
1  2+
(1+)
1+ 1
if xn < 1
(1+)
1

1  (2+)xn
(1+)2  1
(xn)
if 1
(1+)
1

 xn < 1
0 if xn = 1
(38)
Figure 14 depicts PWL as a function of observables xn for linear (solid) and quadratic
(dash) transportation costs. As in the Hotelling model, PWL decreases with market cov-
erage, unless in the optimum the whole market should not be covered; in this case PWL is
constant (25% under linear transportation costs, as in the standard monopoly model with
linear demand). When the whole market is covered both in equilibrium and in the optimum,
there are no welfare losses since, as we mentioned above, social welfare does depend on the
market coverage and not on prices. Other points are worth discussion.
Firstly, PWL can be calculated in all cases. The indeterminacy that occurred in the
Hotelling model does not arise here.
Secondly, as in the Hotelling model and for the same reason, PWL is independent of
demand elasticities and markups.
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Thirdly, since here there are no misallocations due to wrong locations, PWL is smaller
than in the Hotelling model. But these losses may be large.
Finally, Figure 14 shows that PWL is not monotonic in  for given market coverage.
The reason is that a change in  changes welfare both in equilibrium and in the optimal
allocations.
Entry can be considered in this framework by assuming that each rm incurs a xed
cost of entry, K.13 In this case PWL is a (non-monotonic) function of  cp
K
. PWL can
be very large, up to 50%. Given an observation there is a Circular Market with free entry
such that the observation is an equilibrium for this market, and PWL 2  0; 12. Thus, the
introduction of xed costs makes it impossible to infer welfare losses from observations. As
before, knowledge of the demand elasticity or the cross elasticity of demand adds nothing.
All these results agree with those obtained in Corchón (2008) for the case of Cournot
equilibrium with free entry and product homogeneity.
4.4 Vertical Di¤erentiation
In this section we study oligopolistic competition under quality di¤erentiation. This model
was developed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980) and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983).
We consider the simplied version of Shaked and Sutton (1982). Again we have a two-stage
game in which in the rst stage rms compete in quality (one per rm) and in the second
stage they compete in prices.
Consumerspreferences are described by U = ts  p if the consumer purchases one unit
of quality s at price p, and by 0 otherwise. The parameter t of taste for quality is uniformly
distributed across the population of consumers, t  U [a; b] with 0 < a < b. The density is
1
b a .
Assume that there are two rms in the market. Firm i = 1; 2 produces a good of quality
si, where without loss of generality s2 > s1. Suppose further that si must belong to (0; S].
We assume zero costs. In particular, the choice of quality is costless.
Denition 32 A Linear Vertical Market is a list fa; b; Sg with b > a > 0 and S > 0.
13The results reported in this paragraph are available upon request.
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Consider price competition. Consumers with high taste for quality buy the high-quality
good and consumers with lower taste for quality buy the low-quality good (which must be
priced lower to attract any consumer), while consumers with the lowest taste for quality
might not buy at all. A consumer with taste parameter t1 is indi¤erent between purchasing
from rm 1 and not purchasing the di¤erentiated commodity if and only if t1s1 p1 = 0, so
t1 =
p1
s1
. A consumer with taste parameter t2 is indi¤erent between the two brands if and
only if t2s1   p1 = t2s2   p2, so t2 = p2 p1s2 s1 . Therefore, the demand functions read
D1 =
1
b  a (t2  max fa; t1g) =
1
b  a

p2   p1
s2   s1  max

a;
p1
s1

D2 =
1
b  a (b  t2) =
1
b  a

b  p2   p1
s2   s1

Each rm i maximizes its prot i = piDi (pi; pj) with respect to pi. We consider two
possible cases in turn: where the market is not covered (i.e. t1 > a) and where the market
is covered (i.e. t1  a).
Case where the market is not covered. When t1 > a, some consumers with low taste for
quality purchase neither good. Firmsprot maximization yields
p1 =
bs1 (s2   s1)
4s2   s1 and p2 =
2bs2 (s2   s1)
4s2   s1
Then prots read
1 =
b2s1s2 (s2   s1)
(b  a) (4s2   s1)2
and 2 =
4b2s22 (s2   s1)
(b  a) (4s2   s1)2
The condition t1 > a amounts to 0 < s1 < b 4ab a s2 for b  4a.
Case where the market is covered. When t1  a, the market is covered and the con-
sumer with lowest taste parameter weakly prefers to purchase product 1. Firms prot
maximization yields
p1 =
1
3
(s2   s1) (b  2a) and p2 = 1
3
(s2   s1) (2b  a) ;
where b > 2a (for both rms compete for consumers). Then prots read
1 =
(b  2a)2 (s2   s1)
9 (b  a) and 2 =
(2b  a)2 (s2   s1)
9 (b  a)
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Thus, the high-quality rm charges a higher price than the low-quality producer. It also
makes a higher prot. For the whole market to be covered in equilibrium, the consumer
with taste parameter a should weakly prefer a low-quality good to nothing, i.e. as1 p1  0,
which amounts to b 2aa+b s2  s1 < s2 for b > 2a.
Summing up the results of price competition, if 2a < b < 4a an equilibrium arises
where the entire market is covered. If b  4a the market might be not covered and two
types of equilibria arise: an equilibrium with uncovered market for 0 < s1 < b 4ab a s2 and an
equilibrium with covered market for b 2aa+b s2  s1 < s2.
In the rst stage, each rm i maximizes i (si; sj) over si. The "marginal relocation
tendency" of rm 2 reads @2@s2  0 for all s1 and b > 2a, therefore rm 2 chooses the
maximal quality level s2 = S. Firm 1s prot maximization yields
s1 =
8><>:
b 2a
a+b S if 2a < b  8a
4
7S if b > 8a:
Figure 15 depicts s

1
S as a function of
b
a . Note that for 2 <
b
a  8 the entire market is
covered, and the consumer with the lowest taste parameter a is indi¤erent between buying
the low quality product and neither product. The larger the market, the higher the quality
of good 1. The reason is that price competition between two goods drives their prices down
to a level at which not even the consumer with the lowest taste for quality would want to
buy good 1 if its quality is very low. So to attract consumers, rm 1 has to raise the quality
of its good. At some point howeverat ba = 8 exactlyrm 1 prefers to freeze the quality at
constant level s1 =
4
7S and not to serve consumers with low taste parameters such that the
market becomes uncovered. Thus, the discontinuity arises at the point in which the market
becomes uncovered.
Denition 33 An equilibrium in the linear vertical market fa; b; Sg with b > 2a is a list
of qualities fs1; s2g, a list of prices fp1; p2g and the percentage of market coverage m such
that
fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =
8><>:
n
b 2a
a+b S; S;
a(b 2a)
a+b S;
a(2b a)
a+b S; 1
o
if 2a < b  8an
4
7S; S;
1
14Sb;
1
4Sb;
7b
8(b a)
o
if b > 8a:
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Figure 15: s
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1
S as a function of
b
a > 2.
Dene social welfare, denoted by W , as the gross consumerssurplus:
W =
Z t2
maxfa;t1g
s1t
b  adt+
Z b
t2
s2t
b  adt;
which in the equilibrium reads
W  =
8><>:
(5a3 5a2b+2ab2+3b3)
6(b2 a2) S if 2a < b  8a
11b2
24(b a)S if b > 8a:
A social planner would choose the brands quality to maximize the social welfare, thus
so1 = s
o
2 = S. Hence in the optimal allocation there are two undi¤erentiated rms that
make no prot, and the social welfare reads
W o =
(a+ b)
2
S:
Consequently, the percentage of welfare losses reads
PWL = 1  W

W o
=
8><>:
( ba 2)(4+ ba)
3( ba 1)(1+ ba)
2 if 2 < ba  8
( ba)
2 12
12( ba 1)( ba+1)
if ba > 8:
(39)
Figure 16 depicts PWL as a function of ba . Notice that welfare losses are not large, with a
maximum of about 8:33% (which is reached for very large markets, i.e., for ba !1).
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Figure 16: PWL as a function of ba > 2.
We are interested in PWL yielded by this market, conditional on the values taken
by certain variables that can be observed, namely market prices and market coverage.
Formally:
Denition 34 An observation is a list fp1; p2;mg where p1 > 0 is low-quality good price,
p2 > p1 is high-quality good price and m 2 [0; 1] is the percentage of market coverage.
Let us relate PWL with observable variables.
Proposition 35 i) Given an observation fp1; p2;mg where m = 1 and 0 < p1p2  25 , there is
a linear vertical market fa; b; Sg such that
n
S p1p2 p1 ; S; p1; p2;m
o
is an equilibrium for this
market, and
PWL =
p1
p2

6

p1
p2
2   7p1p2 + 2
3

1  p1p2
2 
p1
p2
+ 1
 (40)
ii) Given an observation fp1; p2;mg where 78 < m < 1, and p1p2 = 27 , there is a linear
vertical market fa; b; Sg such that 47S; S; p1; p2;m	 is an equilibrium for this market, and
PWL =

8m
8m 7
2   12
12

8m
8m 7   1

8m
8m 7 + 1
 (41)
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Figure 17: PWL as a function of p1p2 for m = 1 and 0 <
p1
p2
 25 .
Figure 17 depicts PWL as a function of p1p2 for m = 1 and 0 <
p1
p2
 25 . PWL is
easily seen to be single-peaked in the domain
 
0; 25

reaching a maximum at, approximately,
p1
p2
= 0:23. Thus, an increase in relative prices can decrease or increase relative welfare
losses. Figure 18 depicts PWL as a function of m for 78 < m < 1 and
p1
p2
= 27 . Here PWL
depends only on the market coverage, in a decreasing way, as expected.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that the task of nding welfare losses from market data in
models of horizontal (i.e. location) and vertical (i.e. quality) di¤erentiation is feasible,
provided that a specic functional form is assumed.
In location models welfare losses can be very high. Welfare losses are due mainly to lack
of market cover and/or rms located in the wrong positions. To the best of our knowledge,
this point has never been recognized by the literature on empirical measurement of welfare
losses. Markups and demand elasticities do not play any role in determining welfare losses
in the location models considered here. They might play a role if consumers were allowed
to buy several goods.
Under vertical di¤erentiation welfare losses can be read from prices and market coverage
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but they are discontinuous. The percentage of welfare losses here is not very large. Thus,
despite the apparent similarities in the derivation of equilibrium in models of horizontal
and vertical di¤erentiation, these two strands of models are very di¤erent from the point of
view of welfare losses.
The models considered in this paper are symmetric and rely on specic forms of the
commodity space. We hope that our ndings can be used to tackle models with asymmetric
rms, see e.g. Aghion and Schankerman (2004) for a Salop-like model with heterogeneous
costs or with other forms of the commodity space such as the Spokes model of Chen and
Riordan (2007). Another possible extension of our work would be to study consumer and
producer surpluses separately.
4.6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 29: First, consider the case where not all the market is covered, i.e.
m < 1 and x < 14 . Let  =
5p c
4 and  =
p c
4x2
. We easily see that the linear horizontal market
f; ; cg yields a local monopolistic equilibrium where pm = p and fxm1; xm2g = fx; 1  xg.
When x < 1
4
p
5
in the optimum not all the market is covered and PWL = 1   7
5
p
5
. When
x  1
4
p
5
in the optimum the entire market should be covered. Plugging  = 5p c4 and
100
 = p c
4x2
in the second line of (35) yields the second line of (36) for PWL as a function of
observables.
Next, consider the case where the entire market is covered, i.e. m = 1, and the rms
do not locate at the edges of the market, i.e. 0 < x  14 . Let  = 12 (3p  c  2x (p  c))
and  = 2(p c)1 2x . It is straightforward to check that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg
yields a kinked equilibrium where pk = p and fxk1; xk2g = fx; 1  xg. Plugging  =
1
2 (3p  c  2x (p  c)) and  = 2(p c)1 2x in the third line of (35) yields the third line of (36)
for PWL as a function of observables.
Finally, let us consider the case where the entire market is covered, i.e. m = 1, and the
rms locate at the edges of the market, i.e. x = 0. Here, with available observables there
is no way to distinguish between the kinked equilibrium where the rms are located at the
market edges and the competitive equilibrium.
In the case of the kinked equilibrium where the rms are located at the market edges,
let us x 5p c4 <   3p c2 (for condition 34   c < 54 to hold) and let  = 4 (  p).
It is straightforward to check that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg yields a kinked
equilibrium where pk = p and fxk1; xk2g = f0; 1g. From the fourth line of (35) we get PWL
in the kinked equilibrium, denoted as PWLk, as a function of observables and :
PWLk =
3 (  p)
11+ p  12c where
5p  c
4
<   3p  c
2
which is increasing in  and achieves its maximal value of 335 at  =
3p c
2 and its minimal
value of 359 at  =
5p c
4 . This and the continuity of PWLk with respect to  imply that
PWLk 2
 
3
59 ;
3
35

.
In the case of the competitive equilibrium, let us x   5p c4 (for condition  c  54
to hold) and let  = p   c. It is easy to show that the linear horizontal market f; ; cg
yields a competitive equilibrium where pc = p and fxc1; xc2g = f0; 1g. From the fourth line
of (35) we get PWL in the competitive equilibrium, denoted as PWLc, as a function of
observables and :
PWLc =
3 (p  c)
48  47c  p where  
5p  c
4
which is decreasing in  and achieves its maximal value of 359 at  =
5p c
4 and goes to
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0 as  goes to innity. This and the continuity of PWLc with respect to  imply that
PWLc 2
 
0; 359

. Thus, in the case where the entire market is covered and the rms locate
at the edges of the market, i.e. m = 1 and x = 0, PWL 2  0; 335 with 335  0:0857.
Proof of Proposition 31: When x < 1n (that is, not all the market is covered), let
 = (1+)p c and  =
2

p c
x . We easily see that the circular market f; ; c; n;g yields a
local monopolistic equilibrium where pm = p and Di (pm) = x. When xn  1
(1+)
1

in the
optimum the whole market should be covered. Plugging  = (1+)p c and  =
2

p c
x in
(37) yields the formula (38) for PWL as a function of observable market coverage xn and
transportation costs .
Proof of Proposition 35: First, consider the case where the entire market is covered,
m = 1, and 0 < p1p2  25 . Let us x S > 0 and let
p1 =
a (b  2a)
a+ b
S, p2 =
a (2b  a)
a+ b
S;
which yields
a =
p2   p1
S
, b =
(2p2   p1) (p2   p1)
(p2   2p1)S
It is straightforward to check that 2 < ba  8 since 0 < p1p2  25 . Then by construction the
market fa; b; Sg yields an equilibrium where fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =
n
S p1p2 p1 ; S; p1; p2;m
o
.
Plugging a = p2 p1S and b =
(2p2 p1)(p2 p1)
(p2 2p1)S into the rst line of (39) we get (40) for PWL
as a function of an observation fp1; p2;mg.
Second, consider the case where the market is not covered, 78 < m < 1, and
p1
p2
= 27 . Fix
S > 0, a > 0 and let
p1 =
1
14
Sb, p2 =
1
4
Sb and m =
7b
8 (b  a) ;
which yields
b =
8m
8m  7a:
One can easily check that ba > 8 for
7
8 < m < 1. Then by construction the market fa; b; Sg
yields an equilibrium where fs1; s2; p1; p2;mg =

4
7S; S; p1; p2;m
	
. Plugging ba =
8m
8m 7 into
the second line of (39) yields (41) for PWL as a function of observables.
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